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The Commercial Activities program as delineated by OMB
Circular A-76 has been controversial since its inception.
One area of continuing controversy is the accuracy of pre-
award cost estimates for estimating post-award program
savings in operations that are contracted out. This thesis
examines the post-award results of contracting out and
identifies those costs that are either underestimated or not
accounted for in the cost comparison process. Research was
conducted on 14 West Coast activities that contracted out a
food service operation, storage and warehousing operation,
or both under a multi-function contract. The issues
identified by the study include: the need for post-award
guidance and policy, the need for increased claimant
guidance at the field level, the absence of an adequate cost
accounting system and post-award program controls, the need
for increased contract administration staffing, a problem
with budget flexibility at activities that have contracted
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In the process of governing, the Government should not
compete with its citizens. The competitive enterprise
system, characterized by individual freedom and
initiative, is the primary source of national economic
strength. In recognition of this principle, it has been
and continues to be the general policy of the Government,
to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and
services the Government needs. [Ref. l:p. 1-1]
This general policy has guided the development of the
Commercial Activities (CA) program from its initial
promulgation in Bureau of the Budget Bulletin 55-4 in the
mid-fifties, until the latest iteration of OMB Circular A-76
in 1983. Although this basic policy has remained an
integral part of the philosophy behind the CA program, the
major emphasis has changed since 1979 from one of relying on
the private sector, to one of only relying on the private
sector if it is cost effective to do so [Ref. 2].
The switch to cost effectiveness as the primary impetus
behind the program has led to the development of a lengthy
and complex cost comparison process between government
activities and commercial competitors. This cost comparison
process is at the center of most controversy that surrounds
the CA program. It will be examined closely in this study.
B. AREA OF RESEARCH
Proponents of the CA program outline the tremendous cost
savings that have accrued since its inception, relying
heavily on the formal Navy accounting system to capture
these costs. Opponents to the program propose that not all
of the costs associated with program implementation are
captured by the accounting system and that there are "hidden
costs" which make implementation less than cost effective.
At the center of this controversy is the assumption implicit
in the CA program that a pre-award bid to perform a
particular function is an accurate estimate of the actual
post-award cost. The research study that supported this
thesis focused on this aspect of the controversy, and in
particular the so called "hidden costs" of contracting out
or conversion of governmental functions to private sector
operation in Supply Operations of the U.S. Navy. It
examined those costs currently captured by the Navy's formal
accounting and management information systems and assessed
them for accuracy, relevance and completeness. The research
also attempted to identify any relevant costs which have not
been officially recorded, categorize them and determine
their magnitude where possible.
An analytical framework of cost accounting theory was
used as a basis for addressing the following research
questions:
1. Are there unrecorded costs associated with contracting
out a supply operation?
2.
What is the magnitude of these unrecorded costs and
what specifically are they?
3. What is the impact of these "hidden" costs on the
activity, the units it supports, and the activity's
major claimant?
4. Which unrecorded costs are most significant?
5. Are there ways to minimize these costs through
acquisition control techniques, improved specification
writing and/or quality control measures?
6. Is there a significant difference in the post-award
performance effectiveness of supply operations that
have been contracted out and those which haven't? If
there are performance differences, what are those
differences and what are their basic causes?
C. THEORETICAL ISSUES
Since 1979, the rationale for continuing the CA program
has been an efficiency one. OPNAVNOTE 4860 states:
Over the years the Commercial Activities (CA) program has
proven to be one of our most successful efficiency
programs, generating significant resource savings through
contract conversions and through the implementation of
most efficient organizations when functions remain in-
house. [Ref. 3:p. 1]
However, the implementation of efficiency measures in non-
profit organizations, such as the Department of the Navy, is
problematic when one considers the economic behavior that
distinguishes such organizations from their profit-seeking
brethren.
Essentially, the differences lie in the problems that a
non-profit organization experiences in measuring output or
benefits. In a profit-seeking enterprise, the output is
translated into the single profit measure. In a non-profit
organization, the relationship between costs and benefits,
and even the amount of benefits are difficult to measure.
Therefore, the two primary performance measures that are
scrutinized by the profit-oriented sector, efficiency and
effectiveness, are more difficult to assess in a non-profit
organization. Yet this is precisely what the CA program
attempts to do, particularly in the cost comparison process.
The term "Commercial Activities" refers to those
activities or functions within the Government that
Government policy makers have decided can be performed by
the commercial sector because they are inherently
"commercial" in nature. Government activities, on the other
hand, are those activities that by their very nature are
governmental. They are defined to be those functions which
have been characterized as follows:
...so intimately related to the public interest as to
mandate performance by Government employees. These
functions include those activities which require either
the exercise of discretion in applying Government
authority or the use of value judgment in making decisions
for the Government. Governmental functions normally fall
into two categories:
1. The Act of Governing . The discretionary exercise of
Government authority. Examples include criminal
investigations, prosecutions and other judicial
functions; management of Government programs requiring
value judgments, as in direction of the national
defense; management and direction of the Military
Services; activities performed exclusively by military
personnel who are subject to deployment in a combat,
combat support or combat service support role; conduct
of foreign relations; selection of program priorities;
direction of Federal employees; regulation of the use of
space, oceans, navigable rivers and other natural
resources; direction of intelligence and counter-
intelligence operations; and regulation of industry and
commerce, including food and drugs. Also included are
contract administration, personnel management,
chaplains, staff judge advocate and other legal advisory
activities and managerial activities at the level in the
organization where decision-making will affect program
direction. Within the activities listed in this
paragraph, there may be embedded CA functions, such as
word processing and automatic data processing (ADP)
support; these must be identified as reviewable under
the provisions of this instruction. [Ref. 1]
2 . Monetary Transactions and Entitlements .
Transactions and entitlements such as tax collection and
revenue disbursements; control of the treasury accounts
and money supply; and the administration of public
trusts. [Ref. l:pp. 1-3 and 1-4]
This distinction between governmental and commercial
functions within a governmental activity assumes that there
is, in fact, a way to decompose a government activity into a
number of sub-functions where the output can be put into
measurable terms and differentiated from other inter-related
functions without impacting upon their output. Considerable
debate centers on whether these distinctions can be made,
especially in operations that are not "stand alone" in
nature. Also, there is debate on the appropriateness of
using efficiency measures as a basis for controlling these
activities, particularly when outputs may not be reasonably
quantifiable. Alternative means for making decisions in a
non-profit environment will be explored in conjunction with
the data analysis that will form the basis of this research.
In addition to the problems associated with trying to
accurately reflect efficiency in Department of the Navy
operations, there are also questions related to the concept
of relevant costs. Accountants and managers use this
concept to assist them in making choices between
alternatives. Horngren and Foster define relevant costs as
those "expected future costs (expected future revenues) that
will differ among alternatives" [Ref. 4:p. 300], They do
not include costs that would be incurred regardless of which
alternative is chosen, nor do they include "sunk costs"
(those costs which have already been incurred) . For
instance, utility costs (a fixed cost) would be incurred
regardless of whether the government or a contractor
performs a function (assuming government facilities are used
under either alternative) . Therefore, this cost is
irrelevant to the contracting out decision. Once all
relevant costs for each of the two alternatives have been
identified, an "incremental cost" can be determined. "An
incremental cost is the difference in total cost between two
alternatives." [Ref. 4:p. 301] The incremental cost is
used as the basis for choosing between the alternatives.
This thesis will examine whether the Navy has, in fact,
adhered to the principles of relevant costs when
implementing the CA program and defining the cost comparison
process.
A final issue examined in this study involves the
complexities of performance definition and performance
measurement. Because performance cannot be measured
directly, "proxies" or surrogate measures are established
and used as a means of assessing performance (or the quality
of service) . However,
Often, the units by which a commodity is exchanged differ
from those for which it is desired. For example, tires
are measured by ply, size and tread, whereas they are
valued for strength, road-holding ability and longevity;
oranges are sold by weight, which includes the seldom-
wanted skin. [Ref. 5:p. 42]
Thus, the surrogate measures that are established to assess
a contractor's performance may not accurately reflect the
quality of that performance. Additionally, the Performance
Requirements Summary that is generally used as the basis for
deductions on CA contracts can easily become the focus for
measurement manipulation. For instance, an apple is often
judged for tastiness based upon the richness and intensity
of its color. If the farmer determines a means to intensify
the color of the apple without an accompanying enhancement
in flavor, the consumer is often tricked into purchasing an
inferior product. [Ref. 5] It is necessary to examine the
CA program and its results in this context to determine if
the Navy is getting a "redder apple" that lacks quality
taste. Does the CA program as it is presently structured
deal with the problems of performance measurement? Are all
functions that have been defined as "commercial activities"
sufficiently simple to allow for accurate performance
definition? These questions and issues will serve as a
theoretical focus for examining the practical issues and
controversies that surround the cost comparison process and
CA program implementation.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study is limited to research of those
Navy activities on the West Coast of the United States and
the Hawaiian Islands that have undergone cost comparison
studies under the auspices of the Commercial Activities
program and have contracted out their supply operations
—
specifically, food service and storage and warehousing
operations. There have been 823 cost comparison studies
conducted by the Navy during the time period of October 1978
through November 1987. Of these 823, 101 studies have
involved either a food service operation, a storage and
warehousing operation or both (under one of the many
umbrella-type service contracts that have been let under
this program) . Of the 101 studies involving either of these
two functions or both, 27 involved activities located on the
West Coast or Hawaii. Out of the 27 activities that have
conducted cost comparison studies in these functional areas,
14 have contracted out the functions. It is these 14
activities that were the subject of the research conducted
in this study. Research on these 14 activities focused
specifically on the issues of performance effectiveness and
the accuracy of the cost comparison process. Additionally,
some preliminary research was conducted on the type of
procurement method used and strategies for transition and
guality assurance. The study was restricted to activities
on the West Coast because of time limitations and
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accessibility. Supply operations were chosen as the
functional areas for examination because of the authors 1
familiarity with these type of operations and their
knowledge of the technical issues involved.
Research was constrained by the lack of previous study
of cost comparison and performance issues. Archival data on
post-award performance is sparse. It is limited to a few
Auditor General and Naval Audit Service reports commissioned
by the CA Program Implementation offices, and a single
performance study on Motor Vehicle Maintenance conducted by
the RAND Corporation.
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into five sections including this
introductory section. The next section, Chapter II,
provides a historical perspective of the Commercial
Activities program from 1932 until the present. Also
included is a description of the Commercial Activities
program, the evolution of the underlying philosophy behind
it, and some of the practical issues that have stirred
controversies about the CA program and its implementation.
Chapter III presents the methodology used in the conduct of
this study and a synopsis of the results of the data
gathering effort. Chapter IV is divided into three sub-
sections. The first sub-section focuses on post-award
performance and the issues of performance definition and
measurement. The second sub-section analyzes the results of
data collection as they relate specifically to the issue of
cost considerations and the issue of "relevant" costs. The
third sub-section examines training issues within the CA
program. The theoretical issues introduced in this section
provide the analytical framework for analyzing the results
of the data-gathering effort. Chapter V draws conclusions,
identifies specific problems and issues, offers explanations
for the issues where applicable, and proposes corrective
actions as appropriate.
A compilation of overall program data, as assembled by
OPNAV-443 for Fiscal Years 1979-1987 is included as Appendix
A. A table presenting individual cost differentials for the
14 activities involved in the research study is included in
Table 3.6. A copy of the interview questionnaire used in
the data-gathering effort is included as Appendix B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
The issue of determining which functions should be
performed by the private sector and which ones are more
appropriately performed by the government first surfaced
following World War I. In 1932, a special committee was
established by the House of Representatives to determine
which, if any, of the so-called "commercial" functions
assumed by the Government during the war should be
continued. In 1933, the committee recommended termination
of many of these functions within the Government. [Ref. 6]
After World War II, the issue resurfaced as
Congressional committees again focused on commercial
functions that were carried over as governmental
activities after the war years. The general conclusions
of numerous Congressional studies was that the
Government was involved in many unnecessary and
nonessential competitive activities and that efforts
should be made to discontinue activities which could be
provided with 'reasonable convenience and fair and
reasonable prices' by the private sector. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
This area of governmental policy continued to be a topic
of interest and discussion on into the Eisenhower years.
President Eisenhower addressed the subject in his Budget
address in which he stated:
This budget marks the beginning of a movement to shift to
...private enterprise Federal activities which can be more
appropriately and more efficiently carried on that v/ay.
[Ref. 6:p. 3]
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Thus began the first in a series of official government
pronouncements regarding the performance of commercial
functions in the Federal Government.
In 1955, the first written policy concerning commercial
functions was promulgated in the issuance of Bureau of the
Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) Bulletin
55-4. In part, this bulletin said that:
It is the general policy of the administration that the
Federal Government will not start or carry on any
commercial activity to provide a service or product for
its own use if such product or service can be procured
from private enterprise through ordinary business
channels. Exceptions to this policy shall be made by the
head of an agency only where it is clearly demonstrated in
each case that it is not in the public interest to procure
such products or services from private enterprise. [Ref.
6:p. 3]
This Bulletin marked the initial stages of the Commercial
Activities program and was the forerunner of OMB Circular A-
76. However, a significant difference existed in the
philosophy expressed in BOB Bulletin 55-4 and later
iterations of the CA program that emerged in OMB Circular A-
76. The key phrase in the BOB Bulletin was "the federal
government will not start or carry on any commercial
activity ... if such product or service can be procured from
private enterprise." In essence, the Bulletin banned
competition with private enterprise and required reliance on
the private sector for the provision of commercial
functions. This notion of "noncompetition" permeated
Congressional discussions over the next several years,
beginning with Senator McClellan's urging of Congress to go
12
on record "...in favor of a definite policy on noncompeti-
tion with private industry in the production of goods and
the securing of necessary services." [Ref. 2:p. 5] In
fact, during this timeframe there was some movement to
institutionalize the policy by introducing legislation that
would prohibit government competition with the private
sector.
Although official policy in the fifties favored the
shift to commercial sources for performing certain
operations and the notion of noncompetition was espoused,
little actual movement of functions to private sources
occurred. In 1959, the Bulletin was republished with a
revision defining those circumstances which would justify
retention of services in-house. One such exception to
privatization that had a significant impact on the future
evolution of the CA program was cost. However, the language
in the Bulletin (55-4) still "...directed that 'cost should
not usually be the deciding factor in determining whether to
continue the operation as a direct Government operation. 1 "
[Ref. 7:p. 25]
In 1966, the BOB Bulletin was institutionalized in
Bureau of the Budget Circular A-76.
This revision, in addition to institutionalizing the
policy, identified five circumstances under which an
exception to the basic premise could be authorized.
Cost was one of the five. However, while in the 19 59
edition the cost differential had to be 'substantial and
disproportionately large, ' the 1966 Circular liberalized
the language by stating the function can be retained if
13
dealing with a commercial source 'will result in higher
cost to the Government'. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
Although cost was an allowed exception under the 1966
policy, no specific cost comparison process was delineated
in the circular. Therefore, methods were not uniform in
calculating cost differentials and the practice of
justifying the retention of functions in-house on the
premise of a cost exception was not uncommon.
In October 1976, Transmittal Memorandum Number 2 (TM-2)
revised BOB A-76 "by raising the cost factor for civil
service retirement to be used in cost comparisons from 7% to
24.7% of basic pay." [Ref. 7:p. 31] This was the first in
several revisions to the calculation of the civil service
retirement benefit and continues to be an area of
controversy in the cost comparison process. In June 1977,
Transmittal Memorandum Number 3 (TM-3) "re-emphasized the
basic policy contained in BOB A-76 and reduced the
retirement cost factor from 24.7% to 14.1% of basic pay."
[Ref. 7: p. 31] About this time, Congress in a demonstration
of legislative control over the procurement 'purse strings,
'
...displayed their concern for the Commercial or
Industrial Type Activities (CITA, later CA) program, in
the FY 1978 Defense Appropriation Authorization Act.
This Act required OSD, in conjunction with OMB, to submit
in detail, all CITA policy changes since 1967. It also
prohibited any further conversions to contract unless the
policies in effect prior to June 30, 1976 were followed.
The net effect of this action was to negate TM-2 and TM-3
causing the retirement cost factor to revert to a pre-1976
level of 7% of basic pay. [Ref. 7:p. 33]
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Since that time, the rate used for the retirement benefit
has been revised twice more to its present level of 27.05%.
This rate has just changed as of March 1988 to account for
the change in the retirement system for federal employees
hired since December 31, 1983. [Ref. 8] These employees
are covered by social security, and the Congress has been
considering alternative retirement programs for them. The
retirement cost factor has continued to fluctuate and
remains an area of controversy in the cost comparison
process. The debate over this element of the cost
comparison study is likely to continue in the future as the
new retirement system is implemented.
In 1978, GAO,
...issued perhaps its most comprehensive report to date on
the national make-or-buy policy. The report noted that
Federal agencies, to include all branches of DOD,
experienced difficulty first, in ascertaining when to
conduct a comparative cost analysis; and second, how to
determine a reliable, accurate, and justifiable estimate
of in-house costs. In their Report to Congress . GAO also
made the following observations:
1. Complete and accurate in-house cost data is not
readily available.
2. OMB Circular A-76 does not generally require cost
comparisons to support contracting out decisions.
3. OMB Circular A-76 does not require cost
comparisons on activities already contracted out to
assure their continued cost effectiveness.
4. Uncertainty exists concerning the stability and
accuracy of the Government retirement cost factor.
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5. Uncertainty exists on whether in-house costs
should be determined on an incremental or fully
allocated basis.
6. Cost comparisons lack credibility in some cases
because they are often prepared by personnel who are
unqualified or would be affected by actions.
7. Required reviews of the commercial or industrial
activities are far behind schedule. [Ref. 7:pp. 34-
35]
These findings shaped the future evolution of the program
and surfaced issues that still are not resolved.
The year 1979 marks a sharp change in the philosophy of
the Commercial Activities program. The basic premise of
reliance on the private sector for commercial functions
still remained, but the concept of "noncompetition" was
reversed. The emphasis shifted from relying on the private
sector to relying on the private sector if it is cost
effective to do so . [Ref. 2] In September 1984, Joseph B.
Wright, Deputy Director of OMB, testified before a House
Subcommittee that "...for the first time, the basic concept
of A-76 began to change to recognize the equity and value of
having Federal workers compete for the jobs they were
holding." [Ref. 2:p. 8]
Accompanying the revised circular was a comprehensive Cost
Comparison Handbook which provided detailed instructions
for developing cost comparisons of estimated in-house and
contract costs. The Cost Comparison Handbook set forth
standard cost factors and was intended to provide a
uniform methodology for making cost comparisons. [Ref.
6:p. 4]
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"It was a desire to simplify the cost comparison process
and get the program moving again that led to the 198 3
version of A-76." [Ref. 2:p. 8] In essence,
...cost comparison methodology was changed from the
complex full cost method to a simpler incremental
approach. It shortened the cost comparison form from 3 2
to 17 lines. Many of the complex cost computations that
were often contested were either eliminated or replaced by
standard cost factors. [Ref. 9:p. 24]
This revision represents the most current version of the CA
program philosophy and methodology. An update was issued
via Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, dated 12 August 1985, but
no significant changes in philosophy or methodology resulted
from this revision. In conjunction with the Circular, there
is also a Supplement to A-76 that implements the policy in
it by,
...establishing procedures for determining whether
commercial activities should be operated under contract
with commercial sources or in-house using government
facilities and personnel. The supplement is divided into
four parts: policy implementation, writing and
administering performance work statements (PWS),
management study guide, and the cost comparison handbook.
[Ref. 10:p. 7]
Thus, the structural framework for deciding who should
perform certain governmental operations had been
established.
Since 1983, the CA program has remained a topic of
controversy.
Concern about budgetary implications is only one of many
raised in the debate on contracting out. The debate has
continued through successive revisions of the federal
policy and has centered on such issues as fairness,
quality, and accountability. [Ref. ll:p. 10]
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In the early 1980s, then Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger and his Deputy Frank Carlucci established a
series of budgetary initiatives that stressed the need for
effectiveness and efficiencies in the Defense Department.
On 6 January 1986, Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman issued
a memorandum directing the Chief of Naval Operations and
Commandant of the Marine Corps to institute programs to more
efficiently and effectively use civilian personnel within
specified end strengths. Additionally, the memorandum
stressed more vigorous implementation of efficiency reviews,
productivity enhancement programs and the Commercial
Activities program.
Most recently, Executive Order 12615 of November 19,
1987 orders a step-up in the identification and conduct of
cost comparison studies for commercial activity functions.
Among other things, it mandates the identification by April
29, 1988 of all commercial activities currently performed by
the government. It also requires the scheduling by June 30,
1988 of all commercial activities for study in accordance
with the procedures of OMB Circular A-7 6 and the conduct of
annual studies of "not less than 3% of the department or
agency's total civilian population, until all identified
potential commercial activities have been studied." [Ref.
12 :p. 1] Concurrent with the Executive Branch's attempts to
accelerate implementation of the CA program has been
Congressional movement to slow the program down. Under the
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so-called Nichols amendment, championed by Democratic
Representative Bill Nichols of Alabama, the authority for
contracting out commercial activities is transferred for two
years from DOD officials to local base commanders. [Ref.
13]
Also coming out of a House and Senate conference was a
requirement permanently banning the contracting out of
security guard services at military installations.
Contract firefighting had already been prohibited at
installations. And Congress, while it did not pass a
measure banning maintenance by contract at Army depots,
did chide the Army for relegating too many 'mission-
essential' jobs to contract workers and required a report
from the defense secretary by May on how he plans to
correct the situation. [Ref. 13 :p. 20]
This policy tug-of-war between Congress and President Reagan
will likely continue until the end of the President's term,
when a new administration will formulate the future
direction of the Commercial Activities program.
Controversy seems to remain an integral part of the
history of CA program implementation. In the next section,
a general description of the CA process and an overview of
the cost comparison process is presented.
B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION AND COST COMPARISON OVERVIEW
The process involved in implementing the policy outlined
in OMB Circular A-76 consists of basically four phases:
inventory, management review, cost comparison, and
implementation of the results of the cost comparison. The
inventory phase involves the identification of Navy
activities ashore that can be performed by commercial
19
sources. This includes all those functions that are not
excluded because they are "governmental in nature" as
outlined previously.
The management review phase of program implementation
involves systematic examination and analysis by the activity
to identify any special circumstances that would preclude
performance of the function by a commercial source.
The process is initiated when the local command
submits a review format via the chain of command to OPNAV
(OP-443) with certain data specified by OPNAVINST 4860. 6C.
The data are examined and a decision is made whether to
conduct a cost study. During the review process, OPNAV
(OP-44 3) examines each function to determine whether it
should be retained in-house for national defense reasons.
Valid reasons for national defense exemptions are detailed
in OPNAVINST 4860. 6C and include mobilization and
contingency requirements, military training requirements,
maintaining the Navy's sea/shore rotation base and depot
and intermediate level maintenance requirements. [Ref.
10:p. 11]
Other exemptions allowed on a case-by-case basis include
those for core logistics functions and patient care at DOD
hospitals. [Ref. 1] Once a decision has been made to
conduct the cost comparison, the third and most complex
phase of program implementation begins.
The purpose of the cost comparison phase is to determine
if it is more economical to perform the function in-house
using government employees or to contract with a commercial
firm. The cost study itself consists of several different
steps beginning with the development of the Performance Work
Statement (PWS) . The task analysis involved in the
development of the PWS must identify and quantify the output
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generated by the function. This represents one of the most
difficult tasks involved in the CA process and is critical
to the ultimate success of the entire cost comparison study.
The PWS forms the basis of both the government's and
commercial sources' cost estimations/bids and therefore must
accurately reflect what is desired in terms of quality and
performance. "Insofar as possible, the Statement of Work
(PWS) is meant to specify work only in terms of its outcome,
rather than in terms of the procedures used to achieve that
outcome." [Ref. 14: p. 4] Procedural matters are left to
the discretion of the "competing activities" in order to
allow maximum flexibility for achieving efficiencies.
Recognizing the importance of the PWS and to assist
field activities, standard or generic PWSs for the various
functional areas have been developed. Completed DOD
generic PWSs for CA functional areas are being collected
by the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
(DLSIE) , Fort Lee, VA for dissemination upon request of
DOD components and other Federal agencies. [Ref. l:pp. 4-
14 and 4-15]
In addition to specification of the work to be performed, or
the outcome, the PWS also includes a section known as the
Performance Requirements Summary (PRS) which stipulates the
performance standards or quality levels that must be met.
These levels represent the amount of deviation from
"perfect" work allowed before the government will make
monetary assessments against a contractor's monthly billings
for non-compliance, should the function be contracted out.
Therefore, this section of the PWS represents those
functions or outcomes of the operation that the government
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deems most critical to performance success. Included in the
PRS, in addition to the Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) , is a
deduction percentage which approximates the level of
importance that the activity assigns to each of the
performance measures. These performance quality standards
"are designed to be objectively measurable, and quality
control is part of the contractor's responsibility." [Ref.
14 :p. 5] Should the function be contracted out, the PRS
will form the basis of both the contractor's Quality Control
program and the government's Quality Assurance program. The
Quality Assurance program is implemented using government
employees known as Quality Assurance Evaluators (QAEs) or
sometimes called Contract Compliance Representatives, and
consists of conducting regular surveillance to ensure
contract (PWS) compliance.
While a formal quality assurance program is not
required for government performance, the MEO must provide
a capability for evaluating and for clearly documenting
government performance to the standards set by the PWS.
[Ref. l:p. 4-21]
The next step in the CA process is the conduct of a
management study/review with respect to the stated tasks of
the PWS. The objective of this review is to ensure that
the,
. . . in-house work force is organized and staffed as
efficiently and effectively as possible, that the
structure of jobs and positions is considered, and that
internal operating procedures foster efficient production
and proper performance of services (within current
resources). [Ref. 13:p. 13]
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Once this review has been conducted, the organization is
restructured into what is termed as the Most Efficient
Organization or MEO.
Concurrent with the development of the MEO is the
preparation of the in-house cost estimate. Detailed
guidance for preparation of this estimate is contained in
the Cost Comparison Handbook. Category and line-by-line
computational techniques are included in the handbook and
include guidance on such factors as inflation, personnel
costs, materials and supplies, depreciation, overhead,
contract administration, conversion costs, etc. Of
particular note in this process, is the fact that if a
function has been identified as a commercial activity, it
represents a decision that the function does not require any
military positions. (If the CA function was required for
sea/shore rotation purposes, it would have been eligible for
exemption in the previous step.) Therefore, any military
positions in the function under study "...shall be converted
to civilian positions for cost comparison purposes." [Ref.
l:p. 4-19] The cost estimate developed in conjunction with
the MEO is for an "all civilian" in-house operation.
Based upon the requirements of the PWS, the MEO is
costed out using the guidance provided in the Cost
Comparison Handbook and the estimate is presented to the
Contracting Officer in a sealed bid. The government's bid
for providing the product or service is compared to that of
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the lowest, competent and responsive private bidder and a
decision is made to either retain the function in-house,
thus implementing the MEO, or to contract out the function.
Implementation of the results of the cost comparison process
is the final phase of the CA program as it is formally
outlined in written policy and guidance.
The CA program is defined in pre-award terms and
provides little formal guidance for transition to the MEO or
to the contractor. Nor does the formal guidance concern
itself with the post-award process of contract administra-
tion, surveillance and performance except to estimate CA
personnel cost. As noted by questionnaire respondents, if
the program is viewed from a transaction cost perspective,
post-award transaction costs in excess of those anticipated
by the pre-award cost comparison process are often ignored.
It is precisely these areas or transactions that often form
the basis for much of the debate and controversy that
surround the Commercial Activities program. The next
section outlines some of the practical issues that have
arisen as a result of the program's implicit assumption that
pre-award estimates accurately reflect all post-award costs,
particularly in those instances where the cost decision has
been to contract out.
C. PRACTICAL ISSUES
When the ultimate decision of the cost comparison
process has been to contract out, debate occurs at the local
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command level over both the prudence and economy of that
decision. Where contracting out advocates point to
potential savings that can be realized by such a decision,
opponents focus on the post-award consequences of it, such
as possible deterioration in quality of performance, loss of
managerial control and flexibility, morale considerations
and additional costs that are either ignored or underesti-
mated in the pre-award cost estimates. Additionally, there
is debate on the reliability of a contractor's performance
during times of mobilization and discussion of problems with
establishing accountability, even during peacetime.
Proponents of contracting out focus on the fact that,
"private markets are strengthened when the government
refrains from performing commercial activities itself" [Ref.
ll:p. 11]/ contending that many of the "quality" or
performance problems are caused by poorly written
specifications and/or a substandard quality surveillance
program. Navy managers of the program point to the lack of
government experience in this type of effort and poorly
written contracts early on in the program as "the root cause
of most of the contractual problems experienced." [Ref.
2:p. 44]
Little formal research has been conducted to substanti-
ate either side's claims of benefits or costs and a number
of issues have therefore not been sufficiently addressed.
The post-award results of the CA process are rather loosely
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monitored and there is no formal accounting system that
captures litigation costs, conversion costs, contract
administration costs in excess of that allowed for in the
cost comparison process, quality or substandard performance
costs, or the cost of contingency operations.
Other issues have arisen as a result of implementing
contractor operations. For instance, there is no formal
guidance to commands on how to accomplish the "contracted
out" function in the event of contractor default or
bankruptcy or how to manage resource/ fund cuts in the event
of reduced budgets for those functions that are now
performed commercially (particularly in the case of
umbrella-type contracts where all base support operations
are contracted out) . These issues are likely to increase in
importance as the Department of Defense enters a resource-
constrained era and "hidden" costs that were previously
absorbed by the activities can no longer be sustained. The
absence of a formal monitoring system to address post-award
costs ensures that the debate over contracting out will
continue. More importantly, it leaves a gap in the
financial control of these costs and the problem where
management is not alerted to a significant resource
allocation issue. Later chapters of this thesis address
these issues and present some findings on post-award
results.
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The next section presents a statistical overview of the
CA program as it exists in the Navy and the decisions that
resulted from the cost comparison studies conducted thus
far.
D. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
In the period between Fiscal Year (FY) 1979 and FY 1987,
a total of 823 CA cost studies were conducted in the
Department of the Navy, involving approximately 22,000
positions. The net total program savings realized are
estimated to equal $495.2 million. [Ref. 15] Of the 823,
about 58% of the studies resulted in continued in-house
operation and the other 42% converted to contract. Of the
101 studies that involved either food service or storage and
warehousing operations, or both, 52% of the functions
remained in-house and 48% were converted to commercial
sources. For storage and warehousing and/or food service
operations on the West Coast, 52% of the 27 activities
converted to a contractor operation and 48% remained
government operations.
The 14 West Coast activities that converted to contract
and are the subject of this research involve approximately
1492 positions. Two activities involved single function
food service operation contracts (S713) , six involved single
function storage and warehousing operations (T801) and six
were multi-function umbrella or base support type contracts
that included either a food service operation, a storage and
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warehousing operation or both. The in-house MEO bids
exceeded contractor bids on contracted out functions with
total cost differences ranging from 1.105% to 57.175% for
these 14 activities. [Ref. 15] The contractor bids
included an estimate of the contract administration costs
(normally ranging from 4-8% of the MEO bid)
,
but excluded
the 10% of MEO personnel costs that are added before making
the actual contract out decision. The 57.175% differential
occurred at an activity that had no area Department of Labor
wage determination for the type of service being contracted
for. For the follow-on contract at this activity, the
Department of Labor wage determination was established and
the contract increased significantly in price (i.e., by
83.9%), although it was still below the in-house MEO cost.
The Service Contract Act of 1965 provides for the
establishment of minimum wages, benefits and working
conditions for service contract employees. This is
implemented by a Department of Labor wage rate determination
for a specific geographical area. The wage determination
serves as a bottom limit for the contractor on employee
wages and in certain cases reduces some of the contractor's
cost flexibility in contract competition. The average cost
differential between in-house MEO bids and contractor bids
in this research was 17.66%, with a total aggregate
difference across all fourteen activities of 12.66%. Table
3.6 presents cost differentials by individual command.
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For a comprehensive overview of CA program statistics,
see Appendix A. A detailed presentation of data on the 14
activities involved in this study is included in Chapter
III, along with a discussion of the research methodology and
findings.
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III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA PRESENTATION
This chapter presents the criteria used to determine the
sample, as well as an outline of the research methodology
used in conducting the study. Additionally, a presentation
of the demographics of the sample and the data as it was
encountered during the course of the research are included.
Data analysis and the identification of policy issues
revealed by the data are covered in Chapter IV.
A. SAMPLE SELECTION
To determine the population of CA cost comparisons
conducted in the Department of the Navy, a computer print-
out was obtained from the data base maintained by the Chief
of Naval Operations (OPNAV-443) . This listing, dated 27
November 1987, was sorted by "Primary Function Studied."
Each functional area is normally coded by an alpha-numeric
code that indicates the basic operation being studied. A
total of 82 3 cost comparisons had been conducted during the
period from October 1978 (when the first formal cost
comparisons were conducted) to November 1987. A manual
review was conducted on this population listing to select
those studies that were assigned a functional code of either
S713 (Food Service operations) or T801 (Storage and
Warehousing operations) as either the "Primary Function
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Studied" or as the "Secondary Function Code." Multi-
function or the umbrella-type contracts are coded using one
primary function code (usually corresponding to the largest
operation) with all other operations listed as secondary
function codes. During the manual review, it was determined
that 101 cost comparisons had been conducted on Food Service
operations, Storage and Warehousing operations, or both.
Due to time constraints and problems with accessibility, we
focused our data gathering efforts on those Navy activities
located on the West Coast of the United States or Hawaii.
There were 27 activities identified on the computer listing
that involved studies of the supply operations of interest.
Of these 27, 14 operations had been contracted out. Since
the research was primarily concerned with the "hidden costs"
of contracting out, it was these 14 activities that formed
the basis of our study.
In addition to the responses provided by the 14
activities, additional data was gathered in phone interviews
with CA staff personnel at the Chief of Naval Operations
(OPNAV-443) ; Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet
(COMNAVAIRPAC Code 52) ; Commander, Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP Code 0123B) ; and Commander, Naval
Telecommunications Command (COMNAVTELCOM Code N112A) .
Except for OPNAV-443, these commands represent some of the
major claimants for the 14 activities that were studied.
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B. METHODOLOGY
Once the 14 activities of interest had been identified,
phone interviews with key contract administration personnel
were conducted. Key personnel included the Service Contract
Managers (SCMs) , Contracting Officer Technical Representa-
tives (COTRs) , and in some cases, Contracting Officers (KOs)
and Comptrollers (where appropriate) . Key personnel were
contacted at 12 of the 14 commands identified. At one
command the contracted out operation could not be
identified. Both the Supply Officer and Comptroller at this
command maintained that no function had been contracted out
there. Since the operation, as it was identified on the
computer listing, involved only four positions, it was
decided that the additional time needed to "find" the
operation was not justified. One other activity could not
be contacted and is located in Hawaii.
After establishing contact with an activity, outlining
the purpose of our research and assuring anonymity, some
basic background information about the contract involved was
obtained from the contacted commands. A five page interview
questionnaire was used as the primary means of gathering
data and was mailed to the activities after the initial
contact had been established. 75% of the activities
contacted provided a response to the questionnaire. The
interview questionnaire is included in Appendix B. The
information provided in response to the questionnaire is
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summarized in subsequent sections of this chapter. Follow-
on phone interviews were conducted with respondents to
obtain clarification/amplification on responses where
appropriate.
Informal interviews were also conducted with the major
claimants to identify CA issues that had surfaced in
conjunction with the administration of contracts at their
level. Additionally, informal interviews with OPNAV-443
were used as a means of clarifying program and policy issues
that arose in the course of the research, as well as to
clarify statistical information provided by them.
Concurrent with the data gathering effort, an extensive
literature review was also conducted. Several audits on CA
implementation and post-award results were used for
comparison with the results of our data. Additionally,
these audits, along with other research and publications
were used as sources of amplifying information on the
history of the CA program, and for theoretical background
and information on the privatization issue. Finally, the
Cost Comparison Handbook and Navy instructions pertaining to
the implementation of the CA program were also examined.
C. DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE
In order to preserve the anonymity of the sample, a
numerical designation for each activity labels individual
command data. Demographic data was broken down by claimant,
year of the original cost study, number of civilian
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positions involved, dollar value of contractor/MEO bids and
geographic region involved. As the tables following this
section depict, the sample represented a diverse cross-
section of claimancies, contract dollar values, number of
positions involved and year of study. Tables are the
primary means of presenting demographic information relating
to the sample composition and immediately follow this
section. Tables 3.1 and 3.6 present individual command
data. Tables 3.2 through 3.5 summarize information from
Table 3.1 across commands. Table 3.6 specifically deals
with the 14 commands that comprised the sample and depicts
bid differentials where the contractor bid was less than the
MEO bid. For comparative purposes, Table 3.7 presents the
same data as that presented in 3.6 for those 13 commands of
the original 27 that remained in-house. Table 3.8
summarizes information related to Table 3.6.
D. RESULTS OF DATA COLLECTION
Data gathering was conducted primarily by two methods:
1. Formal interview/written responses using the interview
questionnaire included in Appendix B.
2. Informal interviews with questionnaire respondents and
personnel involved in the CA program implementation
process at headquarters and the major claimant level.
In addition to these two methods, a literature review was a
secondary means of substantiating results of our data
gathering effort. This section details the results of this
effort, differentiating each by the research method used.
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TABLE 3.1
BREAKDOWN BY CLAIMANT, YR OF ORIGINAL STUDY AND
POSITIONS INVOLVED
CMD CLAIMANT YR OF STUDY # OF POSITIONS
1 CINCPACFLT FY 1987 400
2 CINCPACFLT FY 1986 152
3 CINCPACFLT FY 1986 269
4* NAVFAC FY 1985 4
5 CINCPACFLT FY 1985 91
6* CINCPACFLT FY 1985 115
7 SPAWAR FY 1983 9
8 SPAWAR FY 1983 253
9 NAVSUP FY 1982 26
10 NAVSUP FY 1982 9
11 NAVSUP FY 1982 6
12 NAVSUP FY 1982 36
13 TELCOM FY 1982 7
14 CINCPACFLT FY 1981 49
* unable to contact these commands
Source: Navy Commercial Activities (CA) Program





NUMBER OF COMMANDS IN SAMPLE BY CLAIMANT
CINCPACFLT NAVFAC NAVSUP TELCOM SPAWAR
6 14 12
TABLE 3.3
NUMBER OF COMMANDS IN SAMPLE BY YEAR OF STUDY*
FY81 FY82 FY83 FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87
1 5 2 3 2 1
*There were no studies in the sample in the FYs 79-80
Source: Navy Commercial Activities (CA) Report, FYs
1979-1987, dtd 02 Nov 87 (OPNAV-443)
TABLE 3.4
SUMMARY OF STUDIES BY NUMBER OF POSITIONS INVOLVED
BELOW 10 11-50 51-149 150-249 OVER 250
5 3 2 1 3
Source: Navy Commercial Activities (CA) Report, FYs
1979-1987, dtd 02 Nov 87 (OPNAV-443)
TABLE 3.5
NUMBER OF COMMANDS IN SAMPLE BY STATE
CALIFORNIA WASHINGTON HAWAII NEVADA
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TABLE 3.6
BREAKDOWN BY MEO AND CONTRACTOR BID AMOUNT (IN $000)
(WEST COAST FUNCTIONS THAT WERE CONTRACTED OUT)*
CMD MEO BID CONTRACT BID % DIFFERENCE
1 $64,312 $58,650 8.804%
2 $30,228 $25,797 14.659%
3 $46,379 $40,024 13.702%
4 $ 5,872 $ 4,968 15.395%
5 $13,276 $ 9,408 29.135%
6 $23,413 $21,645 7.551%
7 $ 1,106 $ 887 19.801%
8 $17,360 $15,336 11.486%
9 $ 3,033 $ 2,245 25.981%
10 $ 892 $ 698 21.749%
11 $ 1,095 $ 1,005 8.219%
12 $ 4,027 $ 3,520 12.590%
13 $ 439 $ 188 57.175%
14 $ 2,262 $ 2,237 1.105%
* Breakdown is for the 14 sample commands (where the
contractor bid was less than the MEO bid) . Contractor
bids do not include 10% MEO labor cost differential that
is added prior to making a contracting out decision.
Source: Navy Commercial Activities (CA) Report, FYs




BREAKDOWN BY MEO AND CONTRACTOR BID AMOUNT (IN $000)
(WEST COAST FUNCTIONS THAT REMAINED IN-HOUSE)*
CMP MEO BID CONTRACT BID % DIFFERENCE
15 $ 154 $ 325 + 111.039%
16 $ 748 $ 689 - 7.888%
17 $ **
18 $ 2,917 $ 4,877 + 67.192%
19 $ 1,648 $ 1,501 - 8.919%
20 $ 1,320 $ 2,568 + 94.545%
2i $ **
22 $ 2,630 $ 2,430 - 7.605%
23 $12,571 $11,437 - 9.021%
24 $ 571 $ 637 + 11.559%
25 $ **
26 $18,716 $19,269 + 2.955%
27 $ **
* Breakdown is for those commands excluded from the sample
because they remained in-house. Negative differentials
indicate that the contractor bid was lower than the MEO
bid before the 10% MEO labor cost was added on (i.e., the
contractor bid was higher once the required labor
differential was included)
.
** Cost data not available for these commands
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TABLE 3.8
SUMMARY BY DOLLAR VALUE OF THE CONTRACT (000)
UNDER 1000 1001-5000 5001-20,000 OVER 20,000
3 5 2 4
1. Questionnaire Results
Overall, respondents indicated that the contractor
had performed satisfactorily since contract award. In fact,
all noted satisfaction with the performance of the current
contractor. Two respondents indicated that previous
contractors had experienced performance problems. One
respondent stated that the poorly performing contractor was
held onboard through the third option year despite poor
performance because there were no other options for
maintaining the operation (i.e., no government employees
left to assume the operation during the resolicitation
process). This contractor subsequently lost the
resolicitation bid. The second activity indicated that the
first contractor was terminated by not exercising the option
year. In all, four commands indicated they were on follow-
on contracts.
Performance assessments were made primarily by using
observation (in all cases) and the results of Quality
Assurance inspections (in all but one of the cases)
.
Additionally, 56% indicated that performance was evaluated
using external inspection results and 78% said customer
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satisfaction measures were used. Although formal
measurement programs were used to assess performance in a
majority of the cases, only three commands actually provided
performance statistics in response to Question #3 of the
interview questionnaire that compared pre-award and post-
award performance. Examination of the statistics provided
by these three commands showed a slight (but not signifi-
cant) decline in performance at one command, a small decline
at another (but still acceptable under the terms of the
contract) , and no change in performance at the third. The
fact that only three commands provided objective data to
substantiate their assessments of satisfactory performance
by the contractor may be an indication of the need for
better control systems to monitor these areas, or the need
for better data base management to access the information.
A majority (56%) of the commands queried had taken
deductions for substandard performance despite acceptable
performance overall. Four commands provided the actual
cumulative dollar amount of deductions taken and in all
cases the amount was less than 1% of the total contract
price. One command indicated that the first contract for
the operation did not include a deduction clause, although
the current contract now has one incorporated. Table 3.9
presents a frequency distribution of the deductions taken as
a percentaqe of the contract price.
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TABLE 3.9
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF $ VALUE OF DEDUCTIONS
AS A PERCENTAGE OF CONTRACT PRICE
.01-. 09% .l-.9% > or = 1% $ Value Unknown
Four commands also indicated that they had issued Contract
Discrepancy Reports both in addition to and in support of
deductions. Other actions taken by activities related to
contractor performance included: contract clarification and
amplification (no re-imbursement involved) , the notation of
sanitation discrepancies for immediate correction, and at
one command, a quarterly performance review with the
contractor was conducted.
All respondents indicated that the current
contractor was experienced in the type of operation they
were performing, with approximately 67% having performed
similar work for the Navy or Department of Defense
previously. About 89% of the respondents indicated that the
dollar amount of the original bid had changed during the
course of the contract, primarily due to scope of work and
procedural changes. Sixty-seven percent indicated that
modifications were made to the PWS during the course of the
contract. Only two respondents indicated that a claim had
been filed against the government on the current contract.
A third command noted that a claim had been filed on a
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previous contract. One claim filed on the current contract
on the contractor's behalf was not upheld so no damages were
involved. However, government time and money were used to
assemble a litigation package of approximately 20 documents.
This included QAE Reports and other substantiating
documentation. The other claim on a current contract was
upheld and the contractor was paid a nominal award of
approximately $3 00. The claim that involved a previous
contractor was settled by the government in behalf of the
contractor for approximately $30K (primarily due to PWS
inadequacies)
.
Two respondents indicated that a sealed bid was used
to award the contract, with two respondents using Small
Business Set-aside procedures. However, the majority of the
activities used negotiated procurement to make the award.
Technical proposals were used in a majority of the awards
(56%) , with only two commands not using one and the others
unsure whether a technical proposal was included as a
contract requirement. Only 44% of the activities were
directly involved in the pre-award survey before contract
award. A pre-award survey is an on-site visit to the
prospective contractor's facilities to assess both the
financial integrity and technical competence of the company
and its personnel.
Responding to the question "Do you feel that the
cost comparison process accurately reflects the cost of
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contracting out?", only two of those queried responded
positively, two did not respond and the remaining five
respondents answered "no." About half of the nine
respondents felt that the contract administration estimate
was too low and this opinion was confirmed by examining the
staffing detailed in several of the responses to another
question on the questionnaire (Question #10) . Those
commands that had the most extensive contract administration
staff were supported in this staffing by a major claimant
that provided substantial pre-award and post-award guidance
and that was heavily involved in the implementation process.
Chapter IV discusses the policy implications of this
staffing decision. Other contract administration costs that
were not anticipated included the time involved in contract
negotiation and the vehicles required for the Quality
Assurance staff.
Another reason for questioning the accuracy of the
cost comparison process is the loss of productivity on the
part of remaining government employees that is not accounted
for. Respondents noted that many remaining government
employees suffered morale problems and were anxious over the
possibility of losing their jobs. Also many workers who
were displaced by the contractor were placed in other
government positions of lower status and pay (once saved pay
provisions run out) . Respondents felt the anxieties and
morale issues that appeared subsequent to contracting out
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impacted on productivity. In addition to morale costs,
respondents noted that post-award litigation costs are not
accounted for. Although only two sample activities had
actually been involved in litigation proceedings on the
current contract, this could be a significant cost in the
aggregate.
A summary of the responses to non-narrative
questions on the interview Questionnaire are included in
Table 3.10.
2 . Informal Interview Results
Informal information was obtained primarily from
representatives of the major claimants responsible for the
sample activities, as well as from OPNAV-443 on policy
clarification issues. However, some informal information
also was obtained from questionnaire respondents in
background discussions conducted during the course of
initial and follow-up interviews.
a. Sample Respondents
Some of the issues surfaced by sample
respondents were the results of "lessons learned" during the
course of CA program implementation. Several respondents
stressed the importance of both command involvement and
positive government attitude toward the incoming contractor
as crucial to the success of a contractor operation. One
respondent indicated that a negative attitude by management
contributed to the failure of an initial contractor,
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TABLE 3.10
SUMMARY OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
QUESTION* YES NO NO RESPONSE
1. Satisfied w/current
contractor performance? 9
4. Deductions taken for
substandard performance? 5 4
7. Litigation/claims filed
against contract? 2 7
12 . Damage to govern-
ment facilities? 18
13. First contractor
performing function? 5 4
15. Dollar amount of
original bid changed? 8 1
17 . Pre-award survey
conducted by command? 4 5
19. Modifications to
PWS experienced? 6 3
20. Technical proposal





actual cost of contract? 2 5 2
* Question numbers correspond to the question number on the
actual questionnaire (included in Appendix B)
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coupled with a poorly written Performance Work Statement.
Another respondent cited strong command support and
involvement in the entire implementation process as critical
to the success of their transition. Command meetings with
all affected Department Heads about 60-90 days prior to the
transition to a contractor operation were used to highlight
contract specifications and identify possible problem areas.
The two commands that experienced prior
contractor performance problems noted that a vaguely
written, unenforceable PWS contributed to contractor
failure. In one case, poor performance was tolerated
because there was no deduction clause in the contract and,
therefore, no way of enforcing standards. This same command
extended the "poor performer" through the next option year
because they lacked alternative means of sustaining the
operation while a new contractor was solicited. The other
command noted that the contract was written to reimburse the
contractor based upon the volume of transactions performed.
Since the volume of work stipulated in the contract was much
greater than the actual volume of work required of the
contractor, the contractor was unable to meet fixed expenses
and, therefore, filed a claim against the government which
was subsequently settled by a reimbursement of about $30K.
Several respondents noted that a major
contributor to contractors' success was their ability to
meet workload changes through flexibility in manning levels
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and simpler hiring practices than those employed by the
government. However, in complex operations where the entire
scope of the mission may change (not just workload volume)
,
it was noted that contracting out reduces government
flexibility. Such changes must be negotiated and the
contract modified to incorporate major mission shifts (often
resulting in higher contract costs). In general, contract
specifications are established well in advance of actual
performance and, particularly in the storage and warehousing
operations, the scope can change significantly over time.
Another aspect of this inflexibility is that one-time
special requirements (often dictated by critical,
operational taskings) cannot be performed quickly because
additional contract negotiations must be conducted and
reimbursement agreed to prior to the contractor assuming
such taskings.
Several respondents noted that they allowed a
small amount of substandard performance in the early stages
of the contract without assessing deductions in order to
enhance working relations between the government and the
contractor, and to allow for a normal learning curve. Once
the initial transition period passed, however, all indicated
that an adequate and competent contract administration staff
was critical to contract success. A detailed and complete
Quality Assurance Plan in conjunction with a competent QA
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staff can ensure that deficient performance is documented
and corrected.
In general, the majority of respondents stated
that the type of contract should be tailored to the
complexity of the operation involved as well as to the need
for coordination among base support activities. High levels
of coordination are better addressed using the multi-
function or umbrella-type contracts, while "stand-alone"
operations can be adequately performed using a single
function contract. Additionally, many respondents would
prefer the use of a "Cost plus Award Fee" contract for those
operations of a complex nature and a "Firm Fixed Price"
contract for the less complex ones. The primary rationale
given for this preference was that the deduction clause
represents a negative incentive and is subject to litigation
(which requires the maintenance of extensive documentation)
while the "award fee" offers the contractor a more positive
performance incentive and cannot be litigated (thereby
lessening documentation requirements) . This type of
contract might be consistent with the "leaner" quality
assurance staffs specified in the Cost Comparison Handbook
guidance. Respondents preferring the Firm Fixed Price
contract felt that it minimized the potential for inflated
contractor costs charged to the government.
Finally, nearly all respondents indicated that
the management review process of the CA program (resulting
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in the MEO) was beneficial in achieving greater command
efficiencies even without a cost comparison. However, a few
respondents noted that this might result in MEOs that are
"so lean" that they are unable to meet PWS requirements. In
general, respondents indicated that they felt the CA program
was saving the government money although the extent of the
savings are not accurately reflected in the cost comparison
process due to unanticipated post-award administrative and
other costs.
b. Major and Sub-Claimant Interviews
Informal interviews were conducted with three of
the five major or sub-claimant activities involved with
administering the CA process at the commands sampled in this
study. The purpose of these interviews was to obtain
claimant perspective on CA program implementation and
contract administration issues occurring at their level. In
addition, one major claimant involved in field support and
training was also interviewed concerning cost comparison
initiatives developed at their level. The activities
contacted included COMNAVTELCOM , COMNAVSUPS YSCOM,
COMNAVAIRPAC , and CNET. These activities varied
considerably in terms of CA program staffing levels and
degree of involvement with field activities in the program
implementation process (including the provision of guidance
and management to them) . COMNAVAIRPAC maintains a staff of
ten personnel who spend at least 30% of their time on CA and
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commissions a small team to assist commands in the cost
comparison process as well as the transition from government
to commercial operation. COMNAVTELCOM has a CA Program
Implementation staff of one (who also performs other duties
unrelated to CA) and is considering expanding this staff to
a two team staff positioned on the East and West Coast to
assist their field activities in the cost comparison and
transition process. COMNAVSUPSYSCOM maintains a staff of
one person located in the Financial Management Department
who is responsible for providing assistance and policy
guidance for the entire NAVSUP claimancy, as well as
performing other budgetary duties.
Many of the issues surfaced at the major and
sub-claimant levels mirrored the concerns voiced by their
field activities. In addition to these issues, however,
there were also several concerns that involved
implementation and management of the CA program at a system
or type commander level, particularly in the budget process.
One major problem of immediate concern to claimants
administering numerous multi-function contracts was the
problem of managing budget execution during times of funding
cuts. Flexibility is greatly reduced when the entire base
support function is provided by commercial sources under a
contract that is legally binding . While renegotiation of
the contract is a possible means for reducing the contract
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cost, the renegotiation process itself is costly and time-
consuming. Additionally, in a CA operation performed in-
house by government employees, management can directly
reduce costs by merely eliminating a number of positions.
In a contractor operation, government management is
constrained to the reduction of contract requirements in the
hope that such a reduction will lead to a decreased contract
price. If sufficient cuts cannot be achieved in the support
areas for a reduction in contract price, the claimant has no
alternative but to take the cuts in the command's
operational areas or use funds from a command that does not
have contracted out functions to pay for those that do.
Another concern voiced by representatives of the
claimancy levels is that Military Personnel, Navy (MP,N)
funding that was reduced or eliminated during conversion
presents additional budgetary constraints. Since Operations
and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) funding is locally managed, a
reduction has an immediate and direct effect on the
activity. Cuts in MPN funds (which are managed centrally)
have a less immediate and direct impact on the activity
since the cuts are spread over a larger funding base. Thus,
resource constraints are more deeply felt by commands that
have contracted out their support functions than those who
have not.
One issue directly related to the cost
comparison process that surfaced at this level, again
51
concerning budget execution, is that conversion costs are
incurred "up-front" as the command goes through the
transition but are allocated over a five year period for
expensing purposes. Normal accounting practice is to
expense these type of costs as they are incurred. By
expensing these costs over the extended period, the command
does not get credit (i.e., funding) for costs that they
actually incur during the transition until several years
later, yet, must absorb them upfront.
In addition to funding inadequacies, major and
sub-claimants also voiced some concern over the lack of
standardization and central policy guidance on the post-
award implementation process. Some claimants indicated that
the information/direction provided by OPNAV was either not
reaching them or was not clear. In fact, this observation
seemed valid since this same major claimant's CA program
manager complained that 1-2 position reviews were not cost
effective and should not be required. This indicated a lack
of awareness at the claimant level of OPNAV s position
against small (less than 10) position reviews that is
clearly outlined in OPNAVNOTE 4860. In general,
interviewees at the claimant level indicated a desire for
more guidance and training on post-award issues,
particularly in contract administration/quality assurance
and transition to contractor operations. Some also noted a
desire for guidance on handling defaulted contracts in terms
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of contingency operations and the resultant costs.
Attrition of government personnel (out of the CA program)
was cited by several of the claimants as a major problem in
maintaining a well-trained, competent contract
administration staff. One claimant had solved this problem
to some degree by maintaining a closely linked information
network within the claimancy and commissioning
"implementation" teams to assist in the cost comparison and
transition process. Members of this claimancy called their
counterparts within the claimancy for advice and information
on problems they had encountered in the transition as well
as the entire contracting out process (including post-award
contract administration problems) . During interviews, it
became apparent that sample members within this claimancy
were aware of the activities and "lessons learned" at other
commands under the same type commander.
In general, the claimants indicated that the
QA/contract administration staffing allowed by the Cost
Comparison Handbook was inadequate to handle complex
operations and the multi-function contracts. One claimant
stated that multi-function contracts involving entire base
support operations should be staffed by approximately 18-2
people who are headed by a Service Contract Manager (SCM)
who serves as the command focal point for all commercial
operations. All noted an awareness that OPNAV-44 3 was
willing to negotiate concerning additional QA staffing
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although some noted that the staffing allowed after
negotiation was still generally too low.
One claimant voiced concern that costs increased
after the expiration of the basic contract although such
increases might also have occurred if the function had
remained in-house. A final issue that surfaced at this
level concerned the inconsistencies between the estimation
techniques used by the government for its employee fringe
benefits in the cost comparison process and those used
during budget formulation. In general, acceleration rates
used in budget formulation range from 16-17% while the cost
comparison process currently uses rates in excess of 27% and
this rate has historically fluctuated widely. This
highlights a continuing concern over the accuracy of the
cost of government labor estimates in the cost comparison
study.
The areas outlined in these two sub-sections
highlight the major concerns and issues surfaced by sample
respondents and their major and sub-claimants during the
course of informal interviews. The next chapter examines
the results of the data gathering effort, analyzes them, and
identifies policy issues that require additional attention
and resolution.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND ISSUE IDENTIFICATION
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first
section discusses data related to the performance issues of
the CA program. The second section addresses unrecorded or
underestimated costs in the cost comparison process and the
budgetary implications of contracting out functions to the
private sector. Lastly, the third section deals with
training issues within the CA Program. The analysis in this
section is based upon the command data collected as well as
from information gathered in the literature review.
Conclusions and recommendations based upon the analysis of
data are presented in Chapter V.
A. PERFORMANCE DATA
The data collected in this research study indicates that
activities having contracted out their food service and/or
storage and warehousing operations were eventually able to
achieve satisfactory performance. However, the period of
time required to achieve satisfactory performance, and the
means of achieving it, varied across claimancies.
Under extensive pre-award and post-award guidance from
COMNAVAIRPAC, the CINCPACFLT activities experienced a
relatively short transition period with only minor
performance deficiencies. COMNAVAIRPAC uses an
"implementation" team fielded from the Type Commander
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offices to assist each of their commands undergoing a CA
Cost Comparison. This team interacts with the command
through each of the successive milestones in the CA
implementation process, including the transition to a
commercial contractor or the MEO, whichever applies. Use of
the team has allowed activities throughout the claimancy to
benefit from the experience of those commands that have
already undergone the process and helped establish an
extensive information network throughout. This network has
also helped minimize the effects of attrition out of the
claimancy because a solid base of expertise has been
constructed.
In contrast to the CINCPACFLT philosophy of providing a
centralized system of CA program guidance and assistance to
their field activities is the relatively decentralized CA
program implementation that exists in the NAVSUP/TELCOM
claimancies. Activities undergoing cost comparison studies
and conversions in these claimancies need to develop their
own strategies and methods for dealing with the issues that
inevitably arise during the process. The claimant is not
staffed to handle both the routine contract administrative
aspects of program implementation at that level and provide
centralized guidance and direction. Both NAVSUP and TELCOM
maintain a staff of only one person to administer the entire
claimancy. However, TELCOM has recently recognized the
benefit of providing centralized guidance and assistance to
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their field activities and is currently developing a two
team approach to assist activities in implementation of the
CA process (one team to assist East Coast commands and one
for the West Coast)
.
The data collected during this research study
demonstrates the beneficial aspects of centralized claimant
guidance. While none of the activities in the CINCPACFLT
claimancy experienced any serious performance problems upon
the initial transition to a contractor operation, 50% of the
NAVSUP activities experienced relatively serious problems
with an initial contractor and eventually achieved
satisfactory performance only through the more costly
process of PWS revision and resolicitation. Under a
decentralized philosophy, each command in the claimancy
often makes the same mistakes as some of their claimancy
counterparts and does not benefit from "lessons learned" by
commands that have undergone the process earlier. The
resources that must be allocated to solve initial
performance problems, revise PWSs, and undergo an additional
resolicitation process might be more efficiently used at the
headquarters level to man an adequate program implementation
staff. This may minimize the instances of litigation as
well. In a recent message to major claimants, CNO has
acknowledged the benefits of centralized guidance in the CA
implementation process and argued "...strongly for vigorous
management oversight by claimants and their activities'
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commanding officers...." [Ref. 17] In particular, the
message noted that:
In general, the most problem-free CA study efforts
have resulted when the claimant or subclaimant has
actively provided oversight and guidance to its field
activities. While the Commanding Officer retains ultimate
responsibility for the conduct of CA studies at his or her
activity, involvement of the claimant in the process is
essential and can yield the following significant
benefits:
A. Such involvement reinforces the importance of
program execution, encourages command-level involvement in
the process, and provides an additional opportunity for
review, thereby minimizing the likelihood of major
omissions or discrepancies.
B. Support from centralized claimant or subclaimant
study teams provides additional benefits. Such support
provides an opportunity for intra-claimant sharing of
lessons learned, provides field activity personnel with an
experienced source of technical assistance for developing
the management study, the MEO, and the PWS, and eliminates
the need to 'reinvent the wheel' at each activity. [Ref.
17]
Another aspect of the centralized guidance issue
surfaced by the contrasting initial performance data of this
research, is the complete absence at any level of post-award
policy and direction. All respondents in the study
expressed a desire for more guidance on the actual conduct
of Quality Assurance surveillance such as that provided by
Quality Assurance manuals and training. Currently, NAVFAC
is the only claimancy that publishes a comprehensive Quality
Assurance manual that includes guidance on sampling and QA
techniques. An adaptation of such a manual tailored for
the other claimancies might be beneficial. Inadequate
quality assurance is often cited as the reason for allowing
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continued substandard performance in a contracted out
operation. For instance, lack of proper documentation by
the Quality Assurance Evaluators can seriously undermine
government efforts at enforcing contract standards and can
jeopardize the government's position in any litigation.
Where quality assurance inspections are inadequate or
poorly documented, the government's ability to assess
deductions for poor performance is severely limited and
performance problems often continue uncorrected. This
frequently leaves commands with the sole option of some form
of termination and resolicitation to correct poor
performance, as happened at two of the commands included in
this study. These options are more costly, disruptive and
time-consuming. Better initial quality assurance can assist
the contractor in correcting problems early on and sometimes
can prevent the need to resort to these more costly
measures. The Naval Audit Service similarly noted a need
for better quality assurance in their "Results of FY 1986
Post-Decision Commercial Activity Reviews at Selected Navy
Activities." In this review the auditors noted that,
The commands and customers interviewed were generally
satisfied with the performance of the CA functions
reviewed but, greater emphasis on quality control and
assurance still appeared needed. . . .Without QC and QA, the
Government has no assurance that the performance standards
in the PWS are being met.
Four of nine contracted CAs reviewed had never
implemented a QA plan and a fifth had not done so until
approximately 16 months after contract start.... One of two
commands that were not making deductions indicated that
the contract provided for rework of unacceptable services.
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This activity's contract, however, called for services
which could not be acceptably reperformed (e.g., taxi
service) and for which deductions could have been
justified. [Ref. 16:p. 7]
These examples highlight the need for a competent,
experienced, well-trained cadre of QA personnel. An
investment in resources to provide guidance and training on
quality assurance will help ensure that this increased level
of expertise on the part of the QA staff is achieved. The
resources invested to provide this centralized guidance
could be at either the CNO or major claimant level. More
tailored contract administration guidance would probably
occur if the major claimant provided it.
Many sample activities indicated the need for some
general guidelines for dealing with such problems as
contractor default or bankruptcy. With the dismantling of a
government operation, activities that have contracted out
their functions are in a particularly precarious situation
in the event of a serious contractor performance problem.
For example, one sample activity continued to pay a
substantially deficient contractor to maintain an operation
simply because the command felt there were no other options
available to them for the resolicitation period. The cost
of any contingency operation that the command might be able
to assemble is often more than the command is willing or
able to absorb.
In general, the civilian personnel recruiting process
necessary to bring onboard temporary government employees to
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assist in sustaining an operation is both time-consuming and
administratively burdensome. In addition, the impact of
personnel moves in such a situation is not limited to the
contracted out function. Often, personnel must be detailed
from other operations within the command to help sustain the
function. This results in impaired operations across
several departments/divisions rather than just the operation
with the failed contractor. However, the process of
bringing a temporary contractor onboard can be equally
costly and troublesome, especially if the initial
performance problems stemmed from an inadequately written
PWS . The respondents in this study felt inadequate to deal
with these post-award issues and would benefit from the
issuance of some general policy guidelines. OPNAV-443
should issue an instruction on the subject of sustaining
service operations in the event of contract termination that
would provide some basic guidance and options to activities
that have contracted out. Naval Audit Service echoed the
need for post-award guidance in their post-decision reviews.
In these reviews it was noted that:
The Government needs to devote more front-end planning
to post-decision activities. The process does not end
with the cost comparison. ... If the function is contracted,
the activity must have a plan for contract administration
and QA. ... Improved front-end planning will help eliminate
back-end problems. [Ref. 16: p. 8]
Another performance-related issue of the CA implementa-
tion process is performance definition. In contracted out
operations, the adequacy of performance is often
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substantially determined by the clarity and completeness of
the Performance Work Statement. Defining performance
requirements is a complex task, complicated by the fact that
all operations change to some degree over time. In simple
operations, such as food service operations or janitorial
services, most of the changes over time involve workload
variation and simple technology changes. The workload
variations merely impact on manning levels and require only
minor modification to the PWS . Technology changes are
generally limited to the introduction of labor-saving
devices and do not require extensive restructuring of the
organization or intensive retraining efforts. Again,
contract modification is minimal.
However, the changes over time that occur in complex
operations such as storage and warehousing or multi-
function contracts are more complicated and, thus, more
difficult to define precisely in a PWS. These operations
often experience change in the mix and type of services, as
well as changes in workload and technology. Technology
changes also are more complex. Often, a change in
technology encompasses a shift to automation from a manual
process, the development of a more sophisticated computer
technology and the incorporation of new or substantially
modified procedures and methods of operation. These changes
nearly always require a restructuring of the organization
and an intensive retraining effort prior to implementation.
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Contract modification and renegotiation becomes more
difficult and costly. It is in these complex operations
where contracting out can become controversial and contract
administration costs expanded. In testimony before the
President's Commission on Privatization, Gene Dodaro,
Associate Director of the General Government Division of GAO
noted that past reviews by GAO and reports by Defense audit
groups show a continuing problem in implementing the CA
process. In particular, he noted that these problems
"...include difficulties in precisely defining the
requirements for needed services and in accurately
estimating all potential costs". [Ref. 18: p. 3] In fact,
Dodaro stated that,
A key implementation concern has been adequate
development of the PWS . Past audit reports have shown
that PWSs have not always precisely defined all necessary
requirements. Task requirements need to be clearly
described to reduce the chances for delays and avoid
increased costs. Mistakes in the PWS can result in
inaccurate estimates of savings.
For example, in a 1985 report we found that in 12 of
2 Defense functions examined, the amount of estimated
savings from contracting out was not fully realized. We
found that for six of these functions, contract cost
increases were caused by errors or ambiguities resulting
from inadequate PWSs. [Ref. 18 :p. 4]
In complex operations, achieving the precision and clarity
necessary to adequately define the performance of work
requires a level of resource allocation that most commands
undergoing the CA cost comparison process find difficult to
absorb "out of hide" (as is currently required by the CA
process) . Therefore, most commands do not allocate
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sufficient resources for the initial formulation of the PWS
,
and the resulting product is poorly written or incomplete.
In the research conducted for this study, all commands that
experienced initial performance problems noted that the
original PWS was inadequate. Additionally, all operations
experiencing these inadequacies were storage and warehousing
operations of a relatively complex nature. The return on
investment from contracting out complex operations might be
improved by allocating the resources used in developing an
adequate PWS to other efficiency programs. An investment in
automation, improved computer technology and robotics may
yield a better return on investment than the CA program in
these type of operations. The issue of performance
definition, particularly in complex operations, needs to be
examined more closely and a determination of the "true
costs" of contracting out in these situations closely
monitored. After a detailed examination of this issue,
policy should be revised either to give more direction in
formulating the PWS, to eliminate complex operations from
the CA inventory entirely or to financially assist commands
that contract out complex operations in the initial stages
of the cost comparison process so that adequate resources
are devoted to defining performance.
A final performance issue related to the contracting out
of operations is the issue of mobilization. Although not
directly addressed by our research, this issue continues to
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be hotly debated between proponents and opponents of
contracting out. Opponents focus on the risk associated
with depending upon commercial contractors to provide
support under conditions of mobilization. Mobilization is
defined as "...the act of preparing for war or other
emergencies by assembling and organizing national
resources." [Ref. 20:p. 2] Proponents of contracting out
state that the private sector has performed admirably in
such situations in the past. Neither side has objective
evidence or data to support their claims. The Logistics
Management Institute performed a study on this issue in
April of 1986 and made some initial conclusions about the
adequacy of contracted out operations to meet mobilization
requirements. They found that,
...mobilization readiness of installation support
contractors is generally not a problem. Most contracts
are for low-skill housekeeping services that can be easily
expanded during a mobilization. The few installations in
each Military Department that have major contracts for
administrative, logistics, or engineering support services
critical to mobilization have taken steps to ensure
contractor readiness. [Ref. 20:p. ii]
The study also noted that continued emphasis on the
Commercial Activities program by DOD will likely increase
the number of contractors providing critical support
services. To ensure the readiness of contractors for
performance in mobilization conditions, the LMI study
recommended that,
...installation managers: (1) have mobilization plans,
(2) delineate mobilization requirements in work
solicitations, (3) include mobilization clauses in their
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contracts, and (4) require contractors to plan for the
recall of former military personnel to active duty. Where
appropriate, installations should include contractors in
mobilization planning and exercises.
We also recommend that installations combine small
s i ng 1 e - f unct ion service contracts into larger
multifunction contracts to allow more flexibility in
achieving high work force and equipment utilization and to
simplify the job of contract administration. [Ref. 20:p.
ii]
Despite the findings of the LMI study, this concern will
remain an issue until contracted out operations are actually
tested in mobilization type scenarios.
B. ACCURACY OF COSTS AND BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS
The majority (approximately 56%) of commands sampled in
this research stated that the cost comparison process did
not accurately reflect the post-award cost of contracting
out. In particular, most noted that the estimate for
contract administration was too low. Specifically, the
activities in the CINCPACFLT claimancy identified this cost
as underestimated, and maintained contract administration
staffs in excess of that allowed by the Cost Comparison
Handbook. These same commands also had smooth transitions,
well informed contract administration staffs, better written
PWSs and uniformly good performance throughout the life of a
contract. It appeared that the claimancy' s investment in
contract administration had paid off and most commands were
satisfied with the CA implementation process (as they had
experienced it) . The other claimancies that did not invest
in more contract administrative staff than specified in the
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Cost Comparison Handbook often had individuals outside the
specified staff conducting contract administration duties on
a part-time basis. In at least three commands, the
secondary attention given to contract administration when it
was a collateral duty resulted in diminished surveillance.
Other audit reviews also have found the cost estimates for
contract administration outlined in the Cost Comparison
Handbook to be insufficient. The Center for Naval Analyses
noted in their study that:
The concerns that led to this study involved large
multifunction or BOS (Base Operating Support) contracts,
many of which breached the OMB staffing standards for
contract administration. The study team did find that for
contracts in excess of $1 million, OMB standards are lower
than staffing levels observed or analyzed in the study.
Based on limited data, this suggests that the OMB
standards do not reflect custom or practice in the field.
The contracts observed in the study were mostly mature,
and might actually reflect a lower level of QA staffing
than new CA contracts might initially need. [Ref. 19: p.
2]
The Naval Audit Service found in their post-decision reviews
that:
The primary reason contracted CAs did not achieve the
savings projected by their cost comparisons is that the
actual cost of contract administration was substantially
higher than estimated. At the time the majority of these
CAs were originally studied, contract administration cost
estimates were limited to between 4 and 6 percent of the
contract price. In all cases, actual costs exceeded these
amounts. [Ref. 16: p. 6]
Although the sample size in this study was small, these
other reviews appear to substantiate the data that was
collected. The estimates for contract administration
outlined in the Cost Comparison Handbook appear to be
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austere at best, particularly if applied to complex
operations. Although the respondents in this research
acknowledged OPNAV-443's willingness to negotiate on QA
staffing, most indicated that they still were unable to
negotiate a sufficient staff to ensure quality performance.
Cost savings attributed to the CA Program are therefore
somewhat overstated since actual costs routinely exceed the
initial estimates. Closer monitoring of contract
administration costs through better cost control/accounting
systems is warranted. The Naval Audit Service likewise
highlighted the need for better cost accounting systems in
their post-decisions review of CA activities in which they
stated:
The Government needs to develop better 'cost
yardsticks 1 for evaluating CAs after a decision has been
made. The existing financial accounting systems do not
capture costs by CA function. This makes the development
of a cost estimate a long, arduous process. Likewise,
these same systems do not capture costs by function after
a decision has been made. This makes a comparison of
estimated and actual costs very difficult. In addition,
the estimates are based on specific assumptions (e.g.,
prevailing wage rates, scope of work, periods of
performance) . If these assumptions do not hold, actual
costs can not be meaningfully compared to cost estimates
unless one or the other is adjusted. Managers need to be
aware of these difficulties and to plan better methods for
determining cost ef ffectiveness. [Ref. 16: pp. 7-8]
Chapter V provides recommendations on implementing a control
system to monitor contract administration and other post-
award costs.
Similar to the question raised on the accuracy of the
initial contract administration estimates is one on the
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accuracy of standard cost factors used in the process. In
particular, the factor used to estimate the cost of the
Government employees' retirement and fringe benefits was
questioned by some sample respondents and major claimants
during informal interviews. This factor has been
controversial since the program's inception and has
fluctuated often during the program's history. The current
factor used in CA cost comparisons is 27.05% as announced by
the Chief of Naval Operations in March 1988. In contrast,
the same factor used to accelerate labor estimates for
budget formulation average approximately 16-17%. The
inconsistency between these two estimates which purport to
address the same factor opens the accuracy of either one to
debate. More research into the rationale behind the two
estimates and the reason for the difference between them
needs to be conducted. Use of standard cost factors (i.e.,
averages) can distort the accuracy of cost estimates because
they tend to inflate the costs of some operations and
deflate those of others. If the costs vary widely over a
range of functions, the distortion will be more severe.
Another issue that arose during the study was the impact
of contracting out on budget flexibility at the command and
major claimant level. As noted earlier, during periods of
budget cuts the base commander of an activity that has
contracted out many functions has considerably less
flexibility because a contract represents a legal
69
obligation. When across-the-board budget cuts are adopted
in the Department of the Navy, activities having large
segments of contracted out functions may have to absorb
these cuts in operational areas if contract renegotiations
fail to result in reduced costs. Another option for
absorbing budget shortfalls is for the major claimant to
absorb the funding cuts at other activities in the claimancy
that have not contracted out. In either case, the
distribution of the funding cuts may not realistically
reflect mission criticality. Critical activities may have
their budgets cut merely because less critical activities'
funding is tied up in a contractual obligation. In general,
CA functions represent base support type activities that
impact less severely on mission performance. When these
functions are retained in-house, they are normally the first
activities to face funding reductions. The impact
contracting out has on budget flexibility needs to be
closely examined and CNO should provide some general
guidelines on alternatives for dealing with funding
reductions to those activities/major claimants having large
multi-function contracts.
In conjunction with the issue raised on budget
flexibility that occurred in this research was the question
of the amount of contract flexibility that is available to
the local manager based on contract type. Contract type
surfaced in this research during the course of interviews
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under several different circumstances. In a performance
context, whether the contract was a sealed bid (one-step
procurement) or negotiated procurement (two-step) appeared
to impact directly on quality of performance, especially in
complex operations. Based upon data results, negotiated
procurement should be the only type of procurement allowed
for complex operations.
In terms of streamlining quality assurance requirements
and providing more positive incentives to the contractor,
several sample respondents indicated the preference for a
Cost Plus Award Fee contract over a Firm Fixed Price one.
Since the award fee aspect of the Cost Plus Award Fee
contract is not subject to the Disputes Clause, the
documentation requirements are considerably less,
particularly if qood performance cannot be assured. A
closer cost analysis that determines the difference (if any)
of costs between contracted out functions using a Firm Fixed
Price contract and those using Cost Plus Award Fee should be
conducted. Consideration should be given to determining the
true cost of contract administration under a Firm Fixed
Price contract as well as a Cost Plus Award Fee contract and
any differences in quality of performance that occur under
the two options.
Finally, the question of contract type surfaced again in
the issue of single function contracts versus umbrella or
multi-function contracts, sometimes known as BOS (Base
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Operating Support) contracts. Based upon data from the
commands in our sample, the activities using multi-function
contracts achieved better and smoother operating contract
operations. This might be explained by the rationale for
using multi-function contracts espoused in the study on
contractor performance during mobilization conducted by
Logistics Management Institute. In this study, LMI asserted
that:
Multifunction contracts provide a more-qualified,
efficient, and well-supported management structure. At
Fort Eustis, for example, the industrial operations
contractor (Northrop) was able to hire retired military
officers who had served at Ft. Eustis in a similar
capacity. . . .The higher corporate headquarters can also be
expected to check the performance of the installation team
and to make corrections where appropriate.
Under multifunction contracts, installation personnel
have to coordinate activities with only one contractor.
Having a single point of contact is particularly important
when support from one function either overlaps or is
reliant on one or more other activities. With the
multifunction contract, determining responsibility in
specific functional areas or ensuring that one contractor
properly supports another becomes the problem of the
primary contractor rather than the Government. [Ref.
20:pp. 12-13]
The advantages of a contractor focal point are mirrored
on the government side of the operation since the contract
administration staff has a similar focal point in the
position of Service Contract Manager (SCM) . These two focal
points facilitate handling customer complaints. Addition-
ally, often economies of scale can be achieved in the entire
contract solicitation, negotiation and administration
process since you are dealing with a single, large
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contractor. At those activities where there are several
functions that are a part of the CA inventory, serious
consideration should be given to the option of a multi-
function contract to handle all of them to take advantage of
these economies.
C. TRAINING ISSUES
The final issue that surfaced on the Commercial
Activities Program in this research is the adequacy of
training. In addition to the training requirements for the
contract administration staff noted earlier, several sample
respondents expressed concern about the overall expertise
within the Navy of the intricacies and options of the CA
program and its implementation process. Several commands,
particularly those in the NAVSUP and TELCOM claimancies
expressed concern over attrition out of the program since a
smaller base of expertise had been established in their
systems. For these claimancies, where the claimant staff
itself consisted of a single person, attrition out of the
program could prove particularly devastating. Many of the
commands in these claimancies expressed the desire for more
comprehensive implementation training than that currently
provided as well as a desire for more comprehensive training
for the Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives
(COTR) and the QAEs. The cost comparison process, along
with the formulation of the PWS, remain troublesome areas to
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deal with for some commands and establishment of training
requirements on these areas were cited as needed.
In conjunction with the need for better training of the
contract administration and CA implementation staffs, there
is need for better training on the part of Contracting
Officers (KOs) in terms of the CA implementation process.
Based upon a few interviews with KOs involved with contracts
at some of the sample activities, there appears to be some
gaps in their knowledge of contractual options available to
them in CA procurements. Although this assessment is made
based upon only limited data, it warrants additional
research since the KO normally takes the lead in determining
the type of procurement, type of contract and method for
technical evaluation. The command undergoing conversion to
contract generally must depend upon the KO's expertise to
guide them in determining the best contract vehicle for
their situation. In a September 23, 1987 memorandum to the
Systems Commands, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) Everett Pyatt emphasized that:
Your continued positive emphasis is expected in
assuring that your procurement professionals are trained
in the full range of contracting methods and are
encouraged to fully employ their knowledge to obtain the
best value for the government. [Ref. 21]
Special training for KOs to be involved in administering CA
contracts, particularly in the contractual aspects of and




In general, more comprehensive, better publicized, and
more accessible training on the CA program is needed.
NAVFAC provides courses on Quality Assurance, but limits the
quotas to NAVFAC activities because the demand for the
course is so great. Some CA implementation courses are
instructed by personnel who have never experienced the
process personally and are therefore not qualified to
address "real-life" issues that can actually occur.
Overall, an assessment of the training offered on the CA
program is warranted and consideration should be given to
expanding the number and variety of courses offered in this
area.
D. SUMMARY OF DATA
The data collected in this research, along with data
gathered in audits and reviews conducted by several federal
agencies, have pinpointed a number of policy issues and
concerns about the CA Program in general and the cost
comparison process in particular. These issues include:
1. The need for centralized guidance at the claimant
level throughout the CA process.
2. The need for post-award guidance and policy including
direction on contract administration and dealing with
performance problems.
3. Difficulty in precisely defining performance in
complex operations and formulating an accurate PWS.
4. The impact of contracting out on base mobilization.
5. The lack of an adequate cost accounting system to
capture post-award costs such as contract
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administration and to accurately reflect other costs
such as the cost of government fringe benefits.
6. Inadequate staffing of the Contract Administration
function.
7. The impact of contracting out on budget flexibility.
8. The impact of type of procurement/type of contract on
contract performance and flexibility.
9. The need for additional training on the CA program.
This list summarizes the major policy issues that emerged in
this research study. Chapter V presents conclusions and
recommends specific actions to deal with these issues.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter provides answers to the research questions
outlined in Chapter I based upon the information obtained
during the data gathering effort. It also presents some
general conclusions on the cost comparison process of the
Commercial Activities program, and offers recommendations to
improve and monitor the accuracy of the process. Finally,
the chapter concludes with issues requiring further study.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The primary research questions used as the framework for
conducting this study are presented in Chapter I. The
conclusions reached on these questions, based upon the data
that was gathered are summarized as follows:
1. There are some unrecorded/underestimated costs
associated with contracting out a supply operation.
2
.
The magnitude of these unrecorded costs are indeter-
minate because the current cost accounting system is
inadequate and is not structured to capture many costs
in a manner that is useable to managers attempting to
make efficiency decisions. Costs not clearly
reflected in the current management information
reports on the costs of contracting out include:
contract administration costs, performance costs
(particularly if a contingency operation is required)
,
litigation costs and clerical support costs related
specifically to contract administration. Also not
reflected are the cost of training, government
employee morale costs and loss of budget flexibility
that accrue when an operation is contracted out.
3. The impact of these costs on the activities and their
major claimants are generally translated into a loss
of managerial flexibility (particularly in the budget
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process) , a decline in morale (and possibly
productivity) among remaining government personnel and
sometimes, a degradation in performance.
4. Of all the unrecorded/underestimated costs that
occurred in the sample under study, the most
significant one was contract administration . This
cost routinely exceeded the 4-8% range generally used
as the cost estimate during the cost comparison
process.
5. There are ways to reduce the number and magnitude of
these "hidden" costs. The techniques found most
successful in this research were: effective and
comprehensive major or sub-claimant program guidance,
well-written Performance Work Statements, well-written
and well implemented Quality Assurance programs, more
centralized guidance on post-award issues and more
accessible and better CA training.
6. Although the research did not identify any significant
performance differences in the supply operations that
were contracted out and those that weren't contracted,
objective performance data to support this conclusion
was either not accessible or not available from most
of the sample commands. The conclusion on performance
is based strictly upon the narrative descriptions of
contractor performance that were provided by the
commands involved in the research e fort. An
investment in contract administration appears to have
been the major factor in attaining and maintaining
quality contractor performance, but these costs are
underestimated under the current guidelines for the
contract administration cost provided in the Cost
Comparison Handbook.
In general, the research conducted for this study
indicates that the monitoring of post-award events and costs
is rather loosely structured in the CA program. This
deficiency allows the controversy concerning the success of
the program to continue unabated since there is an absence
of accurate, appropriate accounting data upon which to base
the assessment. Proponents of the program tend to base
their conclusions of program success on pre-award cost
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estimates that can be misstated as this research indicates.
Opponents of the program focus on anecdotal evidence of
performance and managerial flexibility problems that are,
likewise, not monitored or documented in any systematic
manner. This type of evidence is also subject to
exaggeration and inaccuracies. Actual cost data on
activities that have been contracted out is just not
maintained in a form useful for program management.
Therefore, in view of the absence of any formal post-award
control systems, any determination of the extent of program
success or failure may be deemed suspect. The narrative
data accumulated in this research indicates that the CA
program is ultimately successful in achieving satisfactory
functional performance. However, the extent of cost savings
attributed to the program is probably overstated in many or
most cases. Until deficiencies in the current control
systems are resolved, this assessment will be difficult to
substantiate objectively.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Nine CA program issues were identified as the result of
this research study. These issues form the structural
framework for presenting the recommendations that follow in
the next nine sub-sections.
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1. Need for Centralized Claimant Guidance
The need for centralized guidance at the claimant
level was evident in this research and can be addressed by
major/sub-claimants implementing the following measures:
* Staff CA Program implementation offices with enough
personnel to oversee the transition process at field
activities. A staff of at least two people seems
warranted even at the smaller claimancies to assist in
implementation as well as the routine administration of
the program.
* Field CA implementation teams to conduct on-site
assistance at field activities undergoing the CA
process. Visits should coincide with significant
milestones in the process such as writing the PWS
,
forming the MEO, conducting the cost comparison, etc.
This will allow the activity undergoing the process to
benefit from "lessons learned" at other activities
within the claimancy who have already undergone the
process. It will also develop a "real-life" expertise
at the claimant level which is based upon real
experience rather than expertise based only on an
instruction.
* Publish a synopsis of "Lessons Learned" about the CA
program on a periodic basis and distribute it widely
throughout the claimancy. Solicit regular inputs on
lessons learned from activities that have undergone the
process. Submit a recap of these lessons to OPNAV-44 3
on an annual basis.
* Convene and chair a command meeting at those commands
who will transition to a contractor operation about 60-
90 days prior to the transition. Solicit support from
the CO, XO, and all Department Heads on ensuring the
success of the transition and demonstrate claimant
interest and support. Introduce key command personnel
involved in the transition and have them highlight
contract specifications and possible problem areas.
Reguest the command conduct a follow-up meeting with key
Department Heads and other activities that will be
serviced by the contract operation to discuss concerns
and other possible problem areas.
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2.
Need for Post-Award Guidance and Policy
Current instructions on the CA program focus
entirely on the pre-award process with no systematic
direction provided on post-award issues. The following
recommendations are made to address this deficiency:
* Claimants publish a Quality Assurance Manual similar to
the one published by NAVFAC to assist commands that have
transitioned to contractor operations in establishing
and conducting their Quality Assurance programs. The
manual should contain policy guidelines on sampling
techniques, sample checklists, measurement issues, etc.
The manual should basically be a "how to" type of
publication that can easily be used by QAEs.
* In conjunction with Quality Assurance manuals, claimants
establish QAE training courses or obtain quotas from
other claimancies offering such courses for each of
their commands that will transition to a contractor.
* OPNAV-443 issue an instruction dealing with the post-
award issues of converting to a contract operation. The
instruction should outline possible options for dealing
with contractor performance problems including some
basic guidance on forming contingency plans and
operations. Consideration should be given to
streamlining government personnel recruiting and
detailing procedures to accomodate the need for quickly
assembling temporary operations. Similar stream-lined
procedures for bringing onboard a temporary contractor
also should be made available and publicized.
* Establish a central contingency fund at OPNAV-44 3 to
financially assist commands that must assemble a
contingency operation due to poor contractor
performance. This will allow the activity to rid itself
of deficient contractors until the resolicitation
process can be completed. It would also provide OPNAV-




Problems in Adequately Defining Performance
Despite continued emphasis on developing an adequate
PWS and the publication of a few "generic" PWSs to assist
commands in PWS formulation, adequate performance definition
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remains an issue, particularly for complex CA functions. In
order to address the problems of preparing a well-written,
detailed PWS and to deal with problems of performance
definition, the following recommendations are presented:
* The Navy should conduct audits/research on complex
operations and multi-function contracts to determine the
overall adequacy of the PWSs in these situations. Based
upon the findings of the research, either re-evaluate
and possibly eliminate some of the more complex
operations from the CA inventory or determine what was
done to ensure that the PWS was written well. Consider
the possibility of funding additional resources during
the cost comparison process specifically for PWS prepa-
ration. Develop some CA functional experts at the
claimant level that are available to assist in PWS
preparation for specific functional areas.
* Task base commanders with scheduling CA reviews such
that the simplest CA functions on the base are reviewed
first and the remaining sequence of reviews moves from
the simpler functions to the more complex ones. This
will allow the development of some expertise on PWS
preparation to evolve at the activity before the command
attempts to write a PWS on a complex operation.
* OPNAV-443 publish an annual list of the commands that
have undergone CA reviews sorted by functional area and
distribute to the major claimants. Major claimants
disseminate the list to commands in the claimancy
scheduled to undergo a CA review so that the activity
can contact other commands that have undergone a review
in the same functional area. This will allow commands
to gain access to "proven" PWSs in those functional
areas that will be reviewed at their command.
* Improve availability and/or publicity of the PWS
Preparation training courses.
4 . Impact of Mobilization on Contractor Operations
The issue of how contractors will perform under a
mobilization scenario cannot be completely resolved until
contractors are forced to perform in such a situation.
However, to minimize the risks associated with a contractor
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performing a support function during mobilization, these
recommendations are offered:
* Require a mobilization contingency plan as a part of the
original contract. Require periodic updating of the plan
as a part of the normal report requirements included in
the contract.
* Commands conduct periodic "mobilization drills" with the
contractor similar to those conducted by the Reserves to
test the adequacy of mobilization plans.
* Include mobilization considerations when determining
contract form, evaluating the need for support function
coordination. Multi-function contracts may be easier to
coordinate and administer during periods of
mobilization.
5. Absence of an Adequate Cost Accounting System
This deficiency is major and has an impact on more
than just the management control of the CA program.
Resolving this inadequacy could require major effort and may
be prohibitively costly. However, some minor revisions to
the current system would significantly improve current
management information available for making CA program
decisions. Additionally, further research in this area
should be conducted and may result in more recommendations
for improving the system. The following recommendations are
offered as a result of our limited research:
* NAVCOMPT establish a special Activity Group/Sub-
Activity Group (AG/SAG) code for Base Contractor
Operations. This would allow for separate
identification of all functions that are performed by
the private sector and government support to these
operations. In addition to the special AG/SAG,
establish separate Cost Account Codes (CAC) for
contract administration, contract operations and
contract administration clerical support. This would
allow for the accumulation of actual cost data and
the establishment of a historical cost data base.
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Actual cost data could be used to prepare better cost
estimates during the cost comparison process. Also
better cost control and program monitoring would be
possible.
* Conduct additional studies on the Navy's cost accounting
system and assess the current policy of using standard
cost factors for indirect costs in the cost comparison
process. Particular emphasis should be given to the
rationale/basis for standard cost factors. Research on
the inconsistency between the cost factor used for
accelerating government employees' fringe/retirement
benefits in budget formulation and the factor used in
the CA Cost Comparison process is also warranted.
6
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Understaf f inq of Contract Administration
This research as well as studies/audits conducted by
the Center for Naval Analyses and the Naval Audit Service
indicate that the staffing levels allowed for contract
administration in the Cost Comparison Handbook are not
adequate for actual contractor operations. In view of this
fact, the following actions are recommended:
* Establish an actual cost data base for contract
administration based upon the revisions to the Cost
Accounting system recommended in sub-section 5. Revise
the Cost Comparison Handbook to reflect higher contract
administration staffs in those operations where it is
necessary.
7 Loss of Budget Flexibility
In those operations which have been contracted out,
budget flexibility is greatly reduced. This problem is a
difficult one to deal with and can only partially be
addressed by implementation of the following measure:
* Design/tailor contracts to consider budget reductions.
Establish a baseline contract and price that can be
scaled down to reduced versions once the contractor has
been given 60-90 days notice of the Government's desire
to reduce operations. Include as part of the original
contract package, modifications that represent reduced
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operations (i.e., include stipulations for excluding or
reducing certain services that are part of the baseline
contract) . Require a price quote on the reduced
services as part of the original bid proposal with the
stipulation that the Government may invoke the reduced
version upon proper advance notice. Although this
measure does not allow much more flexibility than the
option of renegotiation already available, it may reduce
the cost of negotiations because they are performed in




Contract Type and Method of Procurement
The need to tailor contract type and method of
procurement to the operation contracted out was highlighted
in this study and is fairly well recognized in the systems
acquisition environment. Considering the special
requirements of the CA process, the measures enumerated
below should be considered:
* Require that all complex and multi-function operations
use negotiated (or the two-step) procurement method.
Incorporate this requirement into OPNAVINST 4860. 7B.
* Conduct a systematic evaluation of the desirability of
using a Cost Plus Award Fee Contract for complex and
multi-function contracts vice Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
contracts. General contracting guidelines stipulate
that FFP contracts are not well-suited for complex or
poorly defined systems or operations.
* Claimants give serious consideration to requiring multi-
function contracts vice single function contracts at
those activities having a large inventory of CA
operations.
9. CA Training Requirements
Additional training in several aspects of the CA
program implementation process were identified in this
study. Specifically, the following training courses need to
be developed or improved:
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* Specialized training for Contracting Officers who will
be administering CA contracts. This training should
concentrate on the most appropriate contracting
techniques, methods and procedures to use in specific
situations. An in-depth presentation of options for
dealing with contractor performance problems
specifically as it relates to CA functions would also be
useful
.
* Statistical training for QAEs, particularly random
sampling techniques and other sampling techniques
appropriate to monitoring service (vice production)
operations.
* Training on performance measurement and conducting
quality surveillance.
* Increased publicity and offerings of CA courses/tools
already in existence. In particular, increased
publicity on the automated Cost Comparison software
developed at CNET, and on Cost Comparison and PWS
Preparation courses is needed.
In summary, the CA program is evolving and the Navy
is still learning from its experience with the program. The
program is controversial and suffers from the lack of
independent and systematic post-award review. In conducting
the research for this study, it became apparent that routine
program management data is difficult to obtain because it is
not systematically collected. In addition, management
reviews and audits of the program are also relatively
limited and small in number. Many of the management debates
currently conducted on the program would benefit greatly
from additional studies and research. The next section
concludes this study with some topics for additional
research.
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C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas surfaced as possible topics for
additional study and research:
- Performance effectiveness and cost savings attributable
to functions that remained in-house after a CA Review
(implementation of the MEO)
.
- An in-depth evaluation of the current Navy Cost
Accounting System and CA Post-Award Control system.
- Use of a Standard Cost versus an Actual Cost basis in
the Cost Comparison process.
- An assessment of the Return on Investment (ROI) of the
CA program versus that of other efficiency measures,
such as automation, robotics, installation of computer
technology and techniques, etc.
- A comparison of the effectiveness and cost savings
achieved on Firm Fixed Price contracts versus Cost Plus
Award Fee contracts for CA functions.
- An evaluation to determine which type of CA functional
areas tend to be more successful under a contractor.
- Research on how to deal with the budget flexibility
problem at commands with CA operations. Possible
examination of the private sector's handling of this
issue on their sub-contracted operations.
- An examination of the private sector's handling of sub-
contracted operations to determine if any of their
techniques might be applicable to CA program management.
- An examination of current CA operations ability to deal
with mobilization.
- Research on the methodology used to determine Government
Employees' Fringe Benefits/Retirement Cost Factor
(reconcile differences in factor used for Budget




NAVY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM:
PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS FYS 1979-1987
NAVY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM
PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS
FYs 1979-1987






NAVY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (CA) PROGRAM
OVERVIEW
ACCOMPLISHMENTS :
- 22,000 positions studied.
- 823 studies conducted.
- $495,000,000 net program savings.
- 13,000 positions saved through either in-house MEO
reduction or conversion to contract.
- 17% In-House MEO Savings Average— FYs 1979-1987.
- 23% In-House MEO Savings Average— FYs 1984-1987.
- 53% of studies result in continued in-house
performance
.
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IMPACT :
- 59% of civilian positions studied are retained in-
house .
- Only 5% of civilian employees in positions eliminated
through conversion to contract are separated.
- Only 10% of total Navy civilian positions will be
studied under CA Program.
CONTRACTING ISSUES ;
- Savings estimated during cost comparison are sustained over
time (anticipated contract savings— 41% vs. actual
contract savings— 40%.)
- 81% of Navy CA contracts awarded to small businesses.
- 68% of annual contract $ paid to small businesses
either as prime or sub-contractors.
- During FY-1987, $154,000,000 in new business awarded to the




- MEO savings over 15% retained by activity for other
use
.
- Navy wins fegardle'sS of outcome of stud^y by reducing
operating costs.
- In the unlikely event that contracting proolems do
occur, i.e., excessive cost growth or incor rectable




IN-HOUSE MEO SAVINGS (3 YEAR FORMULA)
FY POSITIONS SAVED $ PER POSITION* 1 YR $ 3 YR $
79 7 23,100 161,700 485,100
80 25,200
81 1 25,500 25,500 76,500
82 69 27,000 1,863,000 5,589,000
83 492 28,000 13,776,000 41,328,000
84 279 29,400 8,202,600 24,607,800
85 325 29,100 9,457,500 28,372,500
86 236 29,800 7,032,800 21,098,400
87 524 32,900 17,239,600 51,718,800
TOTAL 1,933 $57,758,700 $173,276,100
* NAVCOMPT OP-08 Budget Exhibit figures used. Dollar value shown reflects "per
position" salary for the next year after the cost comparison was completed.
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November 1987
CONTRACT HBO SAVINGS (3 YEAR FORMULA)
FY POSITIONS SAVED $ PER POSITION* I YR $ 3 YR S
79 6 23,100 138,600 415,800
80 3 25,200 75,600 226,800
81 8 25,500 204,000 612,000
82 119 27,000 3,213,000 9,639,000
83 369 28,000 10,332,000 30,996,000
84 258 29,400 7,585,200 22,755,600
85 62 29,100 1,804,200 5,412,600
86 396 29,800 11,800,800 35,402,400
97 371 32,900 12,205,900 36,617,700
TOTAL 1592 $47,359,300 S142.077.900
* NAVCOMPT OP-08 Budget Exhibit figures used. Dollar value shown reflects "per
position" salary for the next year after the cost comparison was completed.
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November 1987
CONTRACT CONVERSION SAVINGS (3 YEAR FORMULA)

























H. CIV/MIL TOTAL % CIV/MIL TOTAL %
79 102/0 102 11 421/439 860 89
80 214/0 214 40 325/0 325 60
81 91/0 91 30 189/25 214 70
82 1119/5 1124 58 783/36 819 42
83 3645/96 3741 57 2531/247 2778 43
84 1777/53 1830 61 1146/28 1174 39
85 1461/46 1507 57 318/837 1155 43
86 999/13 1012 40 1334/163 1497 60
87 1396/13 1409 40 585/1495 2080 60
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1. Studies resulting in In-House Retention :
a. Savings are computed based on the number of
positions eliminated by implementation of the Most
Efficient Organization (MEO)
.
b. Savings are calculated for 3 years (length of
average cost comparison)
.
c. Savings ($) are calculated for each position
eliminated using the "cost per position" used in the
NAVCOMPT Budget Exhibit OP-03 (for the appropriate
fiscal years (s) ) .
Studies resulting in Conversion to Contract ;
a. Two types of savings are realized when a function
goes contract.
(1) MEO Savings.
(2) Conversion Savings—Difference between in-house
and contract bids.
b. MEO Savings are computed using the same criteria as
in 1. above.
c. Conversion savings are calculated for the period




(All $ shown in millions)
IN-HOUSE CONTRACT CONTRACT TOTAL
FISCAL MEO MEO CONVERSION PROGRAM PROGRAM NET
YEAR SAVINGS SAVINGS SAVTNGS SAVINGS EXPENSE PAYBACK
79 $ 0.5 $ 0.4 $ 24.5 $ 25.4 - $ 25.4
80 0.2 5.0 5.2 1.4 3.8
81 0.1 0.6 1.7 2.4 5.0 -2.6
82 5.6 9.6 21.0 36.2 5.1 31.1
83 41.3 31.0 78.1 150.4 23.3 127.1
84 24.6 22.8 23.0 70.4 24.2 46.2
85 28.4 5.4 55.8 89.6 25.4 64.2
86 21.1 35.4 49.9 106.4 22.5 83.9
87 51.7 36.6 46.2 134.5 18.4 116.1
TOTAL $173.3 $142.0 $305.2 $620.5 $125.3 $495.2
NOTES: (1) CA COST COMPARISONS USUALLY COVER A 3 YEAR PERIOD. THE
SAVINGS SHOWN ABOVE REFLECT TOTAL SAVINGS FOR THE COMPARISON
PERIOD.





FY NO. OP ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS $ PER POSITION* COST
79 21,400
80 60 23,100 $1,386,000
81 200 25,200 5,040,000
82 200 25,500 5,100,000
83 864 27,000 23,328,000
84 864 28,000 24,192,000
85 864 29,400 25,401,600
86 773 29,100 22,494,300
87 616 29,800 18,356,800
(88) (475) »** *•**
TOTAL $125,298,700
NAVCOMPT OP-08 Budget Exhibit figures used. Dollar value shown refects "per positic






FUNCTION CODE: S713 T801 BOTH (circle all that
apply)
NUMBER OF BIDDERS
AMOUNT OF WINNING CONTRACT BID:




NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HIRED BY THE CONTRACTOR:
1. Has the winning contractor performed satisfactorily
since contract award? YES NO (Circle one)
2. If yes, what criteria was used to judge performance?
(check all those that apply)
Observation




Customer satisfaction measures _
External inspection results
Internal audit results
Quality Assurance inspection results
Other . Please specify.
3. Do you have the following statistics for both before and
after contract award?
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# Incoming Reports of
Discrepancy (RODs)








































4. Have you ever taken deductions for substandard
performance on this contract? YES NO (Circle one)
5. If so, (a) how many deductions have been made?
(b) what is the average monthly amount of deductions?
(c) what is the cumulative amount of deductions?
(d) what performance was substandard? (i.e., in what
areas was the contractor deficient?)
6. Have you taken any other actions related to contractor
performance? (i.e., Contract Deficiency Reports, etc.)
If so, please explain.
7. Have any litigation proceedings or claims been filed
against your contract? YES NO (Circle one)
8. If so,
(a) what dollar amount was involved?
(b) what were the results?
9. (a) If a claim has been filed, what type and amount of
documentation was required of your command?
(b) What is the approximate number of documents
generated in response to claim proceedings.
10. How many personnel at your command are involved in
contract administration? Please state their titles,
grade level, full-time or part-time (if part-time, give
% of time spent on contract administration) .
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11. Can you identify any additional administrative costs
associated with administering this contract that you did
not anticipate, such as purchase of clocking devices to
determine timeframes for government vs. contractor
responsibility, dealing with contractor/government
disputes, excessive documentation requirements, etc.?
12. (a) Has any damage other than normal wear and tear been
caused by the contractor to government facilities
or equipment?
YES NO (Circle one)
(b) If so, what was the dollar amount of damages
involved?
(c) Did these same type of damages occur when the
function was government-operated? YES NO
(Circle one) If not, please explain any
differences.
13. Is this the first contractor ever to assume
responsibility for this operation?
YES NO (Circle one)
14. If not, what happened to the first contractor (i.e., did
not exercise option, contract default, or lost
resolicitation bid)
15. Has the dollar amount of the original bid changed during
the course of the contract? YES NO (Circle one)
(a) If so, by what amount and for what reason? (i.e.,
mandatory payraises, change in scope or mission,
etc.)
16. Was the original award (a) a sealed bid or (b)
negotiated procurement or (c) neither (Please circle
one)
17. Did your command conduct a pre-award survey before
contract award? YES NO (Circle one)
101
18. If so,
(a) who performed it?
(b) what was actually done?
19. (a) Did your contract experience many modifications to
the PWS during the course of the contract?
YES NO (Circle one)







(c) Did any changes affect contract price?
20. Was a technical proposal required as a part of the pre-
award solicitation process? YES NO (Circle
one)
If so,
(a) who evaluated the proposals?
(b) how long did it take?
21. Was the winning contractor experienced in the type of
operation that they are currently performing?
YES NO
22. What type of assessment was made of the extent of
contractor experience? (i.e., how was it determined?)
Check those that apply.
References
Previous work with Navy
On-site visits of other operations
Other, please specify
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23. Do you feel that the cost comparison process accurately
reflects the cost of contracting out? YES NO
If not, why? Check those items that apply.
Performance/quality considerations not accounted for
4% Administrative cost estimate is too low
Litigation costs are not accounted for
Transition costs are more than 10% differential
Costs for administering RIF procedures not accounted for
Impact on productivity of remaining government workers
is not accounted for
Other (please specify)
Please explain your reasons for those items you checked.
103
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4860. 7B, Subject:
Navy Commercial Activities (CA) Program . 18 March 1986.
2. Deen, W.K., and others, Mobilization Studies Program
Report: Contracting Out and National Security
. Research
Report, The Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
National Defense University, May 1985.
3. Chief of Naval Operations Notice 4860, Subject: Trans-
mittal of OPNAV Commercial Activities (CA) Program
Update . 6 April 1987.
4. Horngren, C.T. and Foster, G. , Cost Accounting: A
Managerial Emphasis . 6th Ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987.
5. Barzel, Y., "Measurement Cost and the Organization of
Markets," Journal of Law and Economics . V. 25, pp. 27-
48, April 1982.
6. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector
General, Department of Defense Implementation of the
Commercial Activities Program . Office of the Inspector
General, 9 March 1983.
7. Hintze, G.G. , OMB A-76: Full Costing and Its Impact at
Installation Level within the U.S. Army . Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
September 1980.
8. Chief of Naval Education and Training Number 116 Change
Transmittal 1, Subject: User's Guide for Automated
Preparation of OMB Circular A-76 Commercial Activities
(CA) Cost Comparison Form (CCF) . 8 March 1988.
9. Roper, B.L., The Commercial Activities Program: Lessons
Learned from Litigations . Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December
1985.
10. Norton, L.F., The Role of the Base Commander in the Navy
Commercial Activities Program . Research Report, The
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense
University, May 1984.
104
11. Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget
Office, Contracting Out; Potential for Reducing Federal
Costs . Congressional Budget Office, June 1987.
12. Executive Branch, Office of the President of the United
States, Executive Order 12615 , Office of the President
of the United States, 18 November 1987.
13. Demers, W.A. , "Contracting Out: A New Twist," Military
Forum , pp. 20-22, January/February 1988.
14. Rand Corporation Defense Manpower Research Center,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower,
Installations, and Logistics) Contract Number MDA903-83-
C-0047, A Pilot Study of the Impact of OMB Circular A-76
on Motor Vehicle Maintenance Cost and Quality in the Air
Force , by R.M. Stolzenberg and S.H. Berry, March 1983.
15. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Commercial Activities (CA)
Program Accomplishments (FYs 1979-1987) . OPNAV 44 3,
November 1987.
16. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Auditor
General, FY 1986 Post-Decision Commercial Activity
Reviews
. Auditor General of the Navy, 7 January 1988.
17. CNO Washington D.C. Naval Message, Subject: Commercial
Activities (CA) Program Management and Execution
.
082246Z MAR 88.
18. General Accounting Office Report to the Congress GGD-88-
7 , Contracting Out for Commercial Activities (CA)
:
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76
.
Comptroller General of the United States, 7 January
1988.
19. Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 87-38,
Commercial Activities Study , by L.S. Brandt and H.L.
Eskew, March 1987.
20. Logistics Management Institute, Department of Defense
Contract Number MDA9 03-85-C-0139 (TASK ML537)
,
Mobilization Readiness of Installation Support
Contractors , by D. Metcalf and D.A. Ault, April 1986.
21. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics)
Source Selection Procedures within the Navy , Office of
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and




Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange 1
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801-6043
Professor Paul M. Carrick, Code 54Ca 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
Professor Larry R. Jones, Code 54Jn 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000
CAPT David Wagonner, USN 1
Force Comptroller (Code 019)
Commander, Naval Air Force
U.S. Pacific Fleet
Naval Air Station, North Island
San Diego, California 92135-5100
CAPT David D. Williams, USN 1
Shore Activities Officer (Code 50)
Commander, Naval Air Force
U.S. Pacific Fleet
Naval Air Station, North Island
San Diego, California 92135-5100
Chief of Naval Operations 1





9. Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-5000
Attn: Mr. Douglas B. Hansen
Director, Installation Services
10. Commanding Officer
Naval Air Station Barber's Point
Barber's Point, Hawaii 96862-5050





Attn: Mr. Jerry Chambers/Don Stalker
Code 19100
12. Commanding Officer
Naval Communications Station Stockton
Rough and Ready Island
Stockton, California 95203





Attn: Mr. Thomas P. Coulthard
Service Contract Manager
14. Commanding Officer
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island
Oak Harbor, Washington 98278-5000
Attn: Ens R.A. Adcock, CEC, USNR
Code CTC
15. Commanding Officer
Naval Supply Center San Diego
Servmart
937 North Harbor Drive




El Centro, California 92243
Attn: Michael Stern, Code 80
107
17. Commanding Officer
Naval Supply Center Puget Sound
Servmart
Bremerton, Washington 98314




Attn: LT Peter Doeling, Code 900
19. Commander
Naval Supply Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20376
Attn: K. Ragunus, Code 012 3B
20. Commander
Naval Telecommunications Command
44 01 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20390
Attn: Wanda Dawson, Code N112A
21. Commanding Officer
Naval Education and Training Program
Management Activity
Pensacola, Florida 32509-5000
Attn: Mr. Joseph T. White, Code 00B31
22. Logistics Management Institute
6400 Goldsboro Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20817-5886
Attn: Mr. Paul Denniman
23. Congressional Budget Office
Room 4 65
2nd and D St. S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20515
Attn: Dr. R. Mark Musell
24. LT Charles P. Cole Jr. SC, USN
LT Nancy S. Cole, SC, USN
537 Long Leaf Road










of contracting out: the
U.S. Navy's implementa-
tion of OMB Circular A-76

